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ABSTRACT
Enforcing federalism is most commonly thought to involve the search for a
constitutional delegation of substantive power.  Although in modern times the sub-
stantive power might be overlapping or shared authority, federalism enforcement
proceeds from a determination about the site of substantive power.  This conception
of federalism enforcement preserves the Constitution’s commitment to fractionated
authority by determining whether power is legitimately possessed.  Thus we under-
stand significant federalism disputes in our age as framed by whether Congress has the
authority to enact comprehensive health care reform legislation, or whether Congress
has exceeded its authority in reenacting the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance require-
ments.  Federalism enforcement as allocation also underwrites much federal courts
doctrine.  We ask whether Congress has the authority to commandeer state courts, or
whether states have the right to close their doors to federal claims.
This Article challenges allocation as the exclusive method of federalism enforce-
ment.  By focusing on the issue of state court duties to federal claims, this Article
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asserts that federalism enforcement includes an alternative to allocation—relational
federalism enforcement.  Relational federalism enforcement is understood as the
judicial mediation of the interaction of the national government and state governments
that goes beyond merely invalidating particular practices as beyond the scope of power
possessed by a particular institutional actor.  Relational federalism enforcement is
grounded in the recognition that the Constitution establishes an enduring relationship
between states and the national government.  Following from this, relational federal-
ism enforcement relies on behavioral norms, imposed on both states and the national
government, that are consistent with the enduring nature of their interaction under the
constitutional structure of federalism.  In contrast to several leading scholars who seek
to justify state court duties to federal claims in relational terms, this Article argues that
any duties imposed on state courts with respect to federal claims are better understood
by looking through a relational lens.  Further, this framework has far-reaching conse-
quences for our understanding of other aspects of judicial federalism—abstention and
Supreme Court appellate review of state court decisions—and legislative federalism—
preemption, Dormant Commerce Clause and Spending Clause controversies.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a creditor bringing suit against an individual to recover on an unpaid
debt in state court.  The debt has been sold to a collection agency, which stands in
for the original creditor.1  After being served with the collection agency’s complaint,
the defendant files a counterclaim in state court under a federal statute, the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).2  The defendant alleges that the collection agency
has violated the FDCPA through a series of allegedly aggressive and illegal acts, which
the defendant contends were intended to threaten, intimidate and harass her into paying
on past debts.3  Must the state court resolve the counter-claimant’s Fair Debt Collection
claim?  What grounds the state court’s obligation?  If the state court is obligated to
entertain the action, can the court dismiss the Fair Debt Collection claim if the counter-
claimant fails to allege facts in her complaint that meet the requirements of the state’s
pleading rules?4  What are state courts’ obligations to federal claims like those brought
under the FDCPA, and what is the scope of the state’s role to exercise control over
state court jurisdiction and procedural rules, given the significant impact this has on
the state court’s capacity to vindicate federal rights claims?5
1 See Andrew Martin, Automated Debt-Collection Lawsuits Engulf Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2010, at B1 (describing the growth in lawsuits brought by collection agencies and their
impact on state tribunals).
2 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006).
3 A practice prohibited by FDCPA. Id. § 1692(d).
4 See Cent. Vt. Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 513, 515–16 (1915) (upholding state
pleading requirement in federal law claim).
5 State court capacity to vindicate federal rights, commonly understood under the broad
heading “parity,” is an enduring aspect of American judicial federalism. State court capacity
to vindicate federal rights was assumed by many of the Framers and was the basis of the their
acceptance of not imposing a mandate on Congress to establish federal courts. For a discussion
of the significance of parity in American judicial federalism, see infra note 475.
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These issues arise out of the structure of American judicial federalism which
represents a commitment to plural, yet interconnected, systems of adjudication.6 
The fact that provisions of the Constitution are aimed at state court judges strongly
suggests that the Constitution assumes the existence of state courts as institutions.7 
Federal courts doctrine enshrines the institutional distinctiveness of state judicial in-
stitutions in its respect for state courts as the final expositors of the meaning of state
law.8  Nevertheless, American judicial federalism’s commitment to the interconnec-
tions between these distinct systems is exemplified by the Constitution’s command
that state judges apply federal law in place of conflicting state law, and, to the extent
of Article III jurisdiction, to claims involving disputes between parties of different
states, regardless of the subject matter.9  Moreover, federal courts doctrine further rec-
ognizes the interconnection between state and federal courts by authorizing Supreme
Court review of state court decisions.10  This recognition of distinctiveness, separation,
interconnection, and union are central elements of the answers that the Court has
provided to the questions posed above.
The Court has avoided imposing absolute obligations on state courts to either enter-
tain federal claims or to forego application of their procedural rules when adjudicating
federal claims.  The Court’s case law has usually made space for the possibility that
state courts might legitimately decline to adjudicate federal claims, by releasing states
with a “valid excuse” from the burden of entertaining federal claims.11  This require-
ment has been recognized as imposing an obligation not to discriminate against federal
claims.12  Moreover, the Court’s case law has avoided imposing a presumption that
state procedural rules are presumptively displaced when they differ from federal rules.13 
6 See Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1399–1402 (2005).
7 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Printz and Testa: The Infrastructure of Federal Supremacy,
32 IND. L. REV. 111, 112–13 (1998) (arguing that the Constitution requires that state courts
exist).
8 See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875); infra Part IV.A.3.
9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
10 See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
11 See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120 (1945) (holding that state court forum non
conveniens rule prohibiting exercise of jurisdiction over federal claim was a “valid excuse”
exception to state court obligation to entertain federal law (citing Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven
& Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387–88 (1929) (recognizing state court refusal to entertain
federal claim where it had a valid excuse to refrain from exercising jurisdiction))).
12 See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 389–94 (1947) (invalidating state procedural rule
that was held to discriminate against federal law because the state court heard analogous non-
federal claims); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934) (same); infra
Part IV.B.
13 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.5 (5th ed. 2007) (noting that state
courts must follow federal procedure if Congress specifies procedure for a particular matter).
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Here, the Court has allowed state procedural rules to stand, unless they “unnecessarily”
burdened or frustrated a federal claim.14
Scholarly commentary has been divided in response to the Court’s jurisprudence
regarding state court obligations to federal law.  Scholars have alternatively defended
or criticized the Court’s doctrine based on their agreement or disagreement with the
imposition of a qualified obligation on state courts.  Scholarly responses might be cate-
gorized in two broad groupings—those who reject the Court’s doctrine as insufficiently
supportive of the vindication of federal rights claims15—and those who defend the
Court’s articulation of a qualified state obligation.16  The critics question the sound-
ness of the Court’s limitation of the state court obligation as either inconsistent with
congressional authority under Article I or the Supremacy Clause.17  They contend that
there is a near-absolute obligation owed to federal claims by state courts.18  This school
is most clearly represented by Professors Martin Redish and Louise Weinberg.
Defenders of the Court’s state obligation case law have argued that it represents
the Court’s recognition of the legitimacy of state courts as distinct institutions.19  This
distinctiveness is exemplified, in part, by state courts’ ability to assert control over their
jurisdictional agendas.  The defenders have argued that the Court’s case law is con-
sistent with both the text and original understanding of the Supremacy Clause.  This
position maintains that the Supremacy Clause speaks only to a state court’s obligation
to follow and apply federal law where there might be a conflict between state and fed-
eral law.20  The limits on state court obligation, they argue, are justified in light of the
Supremacy Clause’s silence regarding a state court’s obligation to entertain federal
law.21  This position is best exemplified by Professor Michael Collins.
Beyond the scholarly response, the most recent judicial response to this question,
in Haywood v. Drown,22 came in a sharply divided decision in favor of displacing the
state’s procedural rule.  There, the Court addressed the issue of whether New York’s
jurisdictional rule requiring damages actions against prison officials to be brought
against the state should be displaced.23  The majority held that the rule violated the
14 See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 150–51 (1988) (holding that state court rule requiring
claims against government entities or officials be filed within 120 days of their occurrence
should be displaced because they frustrated the vindication of rights under § 1983 of the United
States Code).
15 Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power to Commandeer State Courts:
Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71 (1998).
16 Louise Weinberg, The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: “Actual” Conflicts, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 1743 (1992).
17 See infra Part I.B.1.
18 Id.
19 See Jackson, supra note 7, at 112; Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court
Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 42.
20 See Collins, supra note 19, at 40.
21 Id. at 42.
22 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009).
23 See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 24 (Consol. 2005).
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dictates of the Supremacy Clause.24  In a sharply worded dissent, the minority of four
rejected the notion that a state’s procedural rule should be displaced because the rule
did not discriminate against federal claims.25
What appears to unite both the scholarly critics and defenders of the Court’s quali-
fied obligations, and the majority and minority on the Court in Haywood, is that each
argument attempts to resolve the issue of state court obligations to federal claims by ref-
erencing some set of authority that either states or the national government possesses.26 
This identification of a certain set of power, often guided by the reliance upon some
specific constitutional provision, provides the ground upon which an allocation can be
made with respect to whether a set of powers is possessed by the national government
or the states or state courts.  As I have previously argued, this is not unusual in our
federalism discourse, and marks areas beyond judicial federalism.27  This Article’s
central contention is that the scholarly and judicial focus on allocation as a method for
enforcing federalism constraints is at best incomplete, and leaves much of the Court’s
reasoning out of the picture.
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I will provide a brief overview of the
Court’s state obligation case law and the scholarly responses to the Court’s recog-
nition of a qualified state obligation to the vindication of federal claims.
Part II will offer an alternative conception of federalism and its enforcement—
relational federalism based upon an understanding of federalism as an enduring rela-
tionship—that differs from the dominant conception of federalism as a structure of
power division and allocation.28  As against the conception of federalism as solely a
constitutional structure for the allocation of power among governmental spheres, a
relational conception of federalism asserts that the fact of relationship generates norms
of behavior capable of constraining the national and state actors, even where there is
a clear possession of substantive authority by one or both spheres of government.29 
24 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2118. The majority argued that the New York jurisdictional
rule had the effect of immunizing state corrections officers from § 1983 liability. Id. The Court
argued that one of the explicit purposes of § 1983 was to subject perpetrators of constitutional
violations to liability for their wrongs. New York’s decision to shield these private actors from
liability was in conflict with § 1983.
25 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2135 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
26 Id. at 2115 (majority opinion) (holding that states do not possess the authority to divest
their courts of jurisdiction to hear federal claims); id. at 2118–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(discussing the Founding and Constitutional conception of State and Federal Power).
27 See Charlton C. Copeland, Ex parte Young: Sovereignty, Immunity, and the Constitutional
Structure of American Federalism, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 843 (2009).
28 See, e.g., ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 6–7 (2009) (discussing the extent to which federalism is thought
of as a structure for dividing power between the national government and the states); see also
Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 796 (1996).
29 This Article’s use of the term “relational federalism” should be distinguished from its
use in discussions of relationship as an interpretive methodology. As an interpretive method,
reasoning from the Constitution’s structure and relationships is understood to be an alternative
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This Part will articulate a behavioral norm generated from conceiving of federalism
as enduring relationship-interest inclusion.
Part III will address criticisms of relational federalism enforcement.  It will defend
such enforcement as a form of judicial implementation of the Constitution’s commit-
ment to federalism.
Part IV will situate the discussion in the context of other doctrines of judicial
federalism.  This Part is premised on the contention that areas of judicial federal-
ism—abstention and independent and adequate state ground doctrines—exemplify
judicial attempts to mediate the relationship between state and federal courts by con-
straining federal or state power out of recognition of the interests of the other adju-
dicatory system.30
Finally, Part V attempts to recast the Court’s state obligation case law in the light
of a relational conception of federalism enforcement.  This will serve as the ground for
this Article’s critique of the Court’s recent decision in Haywood as a failure by both
the majority and the dissent to take the norm of interest inclusion seriously.
I. THE SEARCH FOR POWER: STATE COURT DUTY TO FEDERAL CLAIMS
In the Court’s decision in Printz v. United States,31 the Court invalidated portions
of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act as unconstitutional commandeering
approach to a Textualist methodology. The structural or relational methodology takes the text
of the Constitution as the starting point but moves beyond the specific clauses of the consti-
tutional text in an attempt to generate meaning from the structures and relationships in the text
with the purpose of establishing the text’s more general meaning. Through such a methodology,
the Constitution might yield more answers to conflicts than would be presumed if constitu-
tional meaning were limited to specific clauses. However, the relational interpretive method
might be placed in the service of allocation decisionmaking—finding sites of delegation and
power from a broader set of sources than does Textualism. Structural and relational method-
ology has been affirmed in many quarters, but its leading proponent remains Charles L. Black.
See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7
(1969); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transnational
Judicial Discourse, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 91, 114 (2004). For a critique of reasoning from
structure and relationship, see John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003 (2009). The relational account of fed-
eralism is more normative than a relational interpretive methodology in that it reads a specific
norm in the federalism relationship.
30 Inclusion in this Part should not be read to suggest substantive agreement with the con-
clusion the Court has reached. Yet, to the extent that this Article argues in favor of interest
inclusion from a normative perspective, the methodology that the Court embraces is one with
which this argument is sympathetic. However, I caution that the discussion of the issues of
abstention and appellate review in this Part will be primarily descriptive in that the Part largely
accepts the doctrinal account in an attempt to highlight certain features in it in an effort to
allow for the possibility of an alternative way of understanding and critiquing the Court’s
work product.
31 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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of state executive officials for the implementation of federal law.32  The Court was
forced to explain the illegitimacy of “executive commandeering” in light of its past
approval of the commandeering of state courts to entertain disputes under federal law.33 
The majority attempted to distinguish judicial versus executive (or legislative) comman-
deering by referencing the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.34  The Court declared
that “th[e] assumption [that state courts could be obligated to entertain federal claims]
was perhaps implicit in one of the provisions of the Constitution [—Article III],35 and
was explicit in another [—the Supremacy Clause].”36  Further, the Court stated “that
state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law—a conclusion mandated by the terms
of the Supremacy Clause . . . .”37  Whether state court duties are justified by explicit
or implicit constitutional provisions, they are justified by the Court’s identification of
constitutionally delegated power or the prohibition of the assertion of power.  This
search for delineated lines of authority has shaped the modern doctrinal and scholarly
commentary surrounding state court duties to federal claims.
Modern case law and commentary on state court duties to federal claims revolves
largely around the meaning of the Supremacy Clause38 or the Inferior Tribunals Clause
of Article I.39  This Part will offer a brief overview of the use of the Supremacy Clause
in both case law and scholarly commentary in order to provide foundation for the con-
tention that each has approached the issue of state court duties as involving a search
for the delegation of, or prohibition on, the exercise of substantive authority.  Here,
the substantive authority primarily involves either national authority to commandeer
state courts to entertain federal claims or a state’s authority to maintain control over its
jurisdictional boundaries.  Regardless of the positions ultimately taken by the Court
32 Id. at 902.
33 Id. at 935.
34 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
35 The Court’s Article III justification rests on a reading of the Madisonian Compromise.
The Madisonian Compromise overcame the stalemate between those who wanted Article III
to require the establishment of lower federal courts and those who sought to limit federal
courts to the creation of the Supreme Court. Printz, 521 U.S. at 907. The Compromise left the
establishment of lower federal courts to congressional choice. Id. As a result of the permis-
sive, rather than mandatory, establishment of lower federal courts, some have argued that state
courts would have been required to entertain federal claims if Congress had chosen not to
establish lower federal courts. For a defense of this understanding of state court obligation,
see Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993). But
see Collins, supra note 19.
36 Printz, 521 U.S. at 907.
37 Id. at 928 (applying Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), to New York v. United States,
504 U.S. 114 (1992)).
38 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
39 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (“[The Congress shall have Power] To constitute Tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court[.]”).
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and the scholarly community each side has been primarily committed to grounding
state court duties in the clauses of the Constitution that provide support for the allo-
cation decision that is sought.40
A. The Doctrine: The Exercise of Power
The development of a doctrinal framework for determining when state courts’
ordinary jurisdictional control must yield in the face of federal claims raises important
questions in American judicial federalism.  To suggest that state distinctiveness is not
compromised whenever a state must reallocate its own judicial resources to entertain
federal claims fails to recognize how central the issue of state court integrity has been
to those who challenged the growth of the national government and its judiciary.41 
However, the vindication of federal claims—and the role envisioned by state courts
in this process—has been an integral theme in American constitutional law and federal
courts jurisprudence.42  The contestation of these values has shaped American federal
courts doctrine.43  Indeed, the contestation of these values has shaped the Court’s doc-
trinal framework for determining when a state court has shirked its duty to federal law.
The citation with which the Court supports its conclusion that the Constitution
authorizes commandeering state courts is its 1947 decision, Testa v. Katt.44  Testa
clearly stands as the modern articulation of the state court’s obligation to entertain fed-
eral claims.45  It also provides rhetorical support for understanding state court duties as
based in substantive allocation of power to the national government, or the denial of the
exercise of power to the states.46  As such, it is almost as important as the Supremacy
Clause in understanding the modern conception of the basis of state court obligation.
In Testa, the Court rejected Rhode Island’s refusal to hear a claim brought under
the Emergency Price Control Act47 on the ground that the statute’s allowance for treble
40 The interpretation offered in this Part will be contrasted against a relational reading of
the Court’s case law in this area.
41 Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitution argued that the expansive power of the
national government would prove ruinous for states and state courts. For an Anti-Federalist
discussion of this debate with regard to state courts, see Essays of Brutus, No. 1, N.Y. J.,
Oct. 18, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 363–72 (Herbert J. Storing
& Murray Dry eds., 1981).
42 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141
(1988) (presenting the twin pulls of nationalist and federalist models as the primary organizing
framework for understanding federal courts doctrine).
43 See id.; see also DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995) (arguing that fed-
eralism is persistent “dialogue” between proponents of national authority and state authority).
44 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
45 Id. at 394.
46 Id. at 389. I have emphasized a relational reading of this case in previous writing. Though
I adhere to this reading, Testa exhibits dimensions of both allocation and relational federalism.
See Copeland, supra note 27, at 858–59 & n.75.
47 Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
520 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:511
damages was inconsistent with state policy prohibiting state courts from enforcing the
penal laws of foreign governments.48  The Court overturned the state court’s ruling,
declaring that its treatment of federal law “disregards the purpose and effect of [the
Supremacy Clause]. . . .”49  The Court’s reliance on the Supremacy Clause—more ex-
plicit than in earlier law involving state court obligation to federal claims—positions
the Supremacy Clause as a means to limit the exercise of substantive state authority. 
The Court framed the issue before it as one involving “the right of a state to deny en-
forcement to claims growing out of a valid federal law.”50  Understood in this way,
the Court’s decision became a decision about determining whether the state possesses
a right (understood as power and authority) to reject federal claims.  Determining the
existence of this power (or its absence) essentially resolves the dispute.51
B. The Critique
1. Absolute Obligations to Federal Claims and the Search for Power
Unlike most scholarly commentators who have addressed the question of state
court duty to federal claims as a federalism problem, Professor Martin Redish and his
co-author Steven Sklaver have rejected the Supremacy Clause as a basis for comman-
deering state courts.52  Rather they have turned their attention to Congress’s power
under Article I.53  This exemplifies the extent to which Redish and Sklaver frame the
inquiry about state obligation as one involving a determination of the delegation of
power to the national government.  Redish and Sklaver argue that state courts owe an
absolute duty to entertain federal claims, and that there ought to be a presumption in
favor of the displacement of state procedural rules where federal claims are adjudi-
cated in state courts.54  Framing the inquiry as one focused on determining the textual
48 See Testa v. Katt, 47 A.2d 312, 314 (R.I. 1946).
49 Testa, 330 U.S. at 389.
50 Id. at 394.
51 There has been criticism of the Court’s use of the Supremacy Clause to ground the state
court obligation to entertain federal claims. Scholars have argued that the Supremacy Clause
does not answer the question of the basis of Congress’s authority to assign or to compel state
courts to adjudicate federal claims. Professor Martin Redish, as will be discussed more fully
below, has offered the Inferior Tribunals Clause of Article I as the constitutional basis for
grounding the federal power to commandeer state courts.
52 Redish & Sklaver, supra note 15, at 76; see, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Congressional
Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949, 1009–12 (2006).
53 For discussions that assert that the Inferior Tribunals Clause empowers Congress to
impose jurisdiction on state courts to entertain federal claims, see Redish & Sklaver, supra
note 15, at 88–89 (asserting that “the enumerated congressional powers contained in Article I,
§ 8, read in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause,” are the foundation of
Congress’s authority to commandeer state courts); see also James E. Pfander, Federal
Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping
Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 191 (2007).
54 Redish & Sklaver, supra note 15, at 105 & n.180.
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foundation of the national assertion of power, Redish and Sklaver argue that national
authority to impose obligations on state courts lies not with the Supremacy Clause, but
rather in Article I’s Necessary and Proper Clause.55  Redish and Sklaver contend that
the Clause empowers Congress to do all that is necessary and proper to achieve its
substantive legislative ends—which easily include protecting the vindication of federal
claims.56  Having recognized the existence of this power as an affirmative constitu-
tional delegation, Redish and Sklaver appear to reject any judicial attempt to undercut
this power through doctrinal frameworks that allow states to reject their obligations
to federal claims.57
Redish and Sklaver do not rest their argument against the current doctrinal frame-
work with the assertion of Article I’s affirmative grant of power.  Their conclusion
about the legitimacy of national commandeering power draws on more than simply
the text of Article I, but extends to “historical and philosophical” factors that further
support their thesis.58  Redish and Sklaver argue that the vindication of federal law and
federal supremacy are the most paramount value in judicial federalism.59  From this
perspective, state court authority and obligation to entertain federal claims is premised
upon the Constitution’s commitment to the preservation of the supremacy of federal
law.60  Where this preservation involves harnessing state judiciaries, Congress is em-
powered to obligate state courts to open their doors to disputes based on federal law.61
Understood on these grounds, the Redish and Sklaver thesis contends that state
court authority to entertain federal claims does not evidence “respect for the status or
abilities of state judiciaries,”62 but rather confirms their subordination to the overriding
“principle of federal dominance.”63  Further, this activation of state judiciaries for
federal purposes is not premised upon their equality with their federal counterparts,
but based directly on their inferiority to the requirements of the vindication of fed-
eral law.64  According to Redish and Sklaver, the Constitution empowers the national
government to treat state courts as available to serve federal interests, seemingly
without qualification.65
What is important, for our purposes, about Redish and Sklaver’s argument is not
necessarily its conclusions, but their framework for analyzing this particular dispute,
55 Id. at 88–89.
56 Id. at 89.
57 Id. at 89–90 & nn.99–103 (examining the various opinions and assertions of Justices
Thomas and Scalia in Printz).
58 Id. at 73. For an extended discussion of Redish and Sklaver’s view on the historical and
philosophical foundations, see id. at 75–88.
59 Id. at 92–93.
60 Id. at 93.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 73.
63 Id. at 95.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 93.
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and its implications for other issues in judicial federalism.  For Redish and Sklaver,
the determination of whether a state court has shirked its duties to federal claims is an
inquiry that seeks to determine the existence and scope of national power.66  Once it
is determined that power is possessed to commandeer state court institutions for the
vindication of federal claims, the inquiry appears to be over.  There are no further
questions about other possible bases for constraining such exercises of authority.  Per-
haps this should not be surprising in light of Redish and Sklaver’s commitment to the
“federal dominance” principle as there seems to be no competing principle— certainly
not state court distinctiveness—that rises to the level of similar constitutional concern.67
Though Redish and Sklaver are explicit in their search for legitimately possessed
commandeering power in determining state court obligations to federal law, Professor
Louise Weinberg’s critique of the Court’s doctrinal framework is less explicit regarding
the designation of national authority.  In Weinberg’s critique of current doctrine, the
Supremacy Clause seems to play the role of determining what actions are prohibited
by state courts—no less an allocation determination than one involving an inquiry
into what power is possessed by a level of government.68  Weinberg’s reading of the
Supremacy Clause requires the displacement of state law whenever there is an “actual”
conflict between state and federal law.69  What is central to understanding Weinberg’s
critique of current doctrine is the expansiveness with which Weinberg reads conflicts
between state and federal rules where federal claims are involved.  For Weinberg, the
Supremacy Clause imposes an obligation on state courts to entertain federal claims.70 
Although Weinberg does not articulate a principle of federal dominance, as do Redish
and Sklaver, it seems clear that the framework places great weight on the vindication
of federal claims.71  Any state rule that “impede[s] enforcement of federal law” is,
for Weinberg, inconsistent with the federal law.72
For Weinberg doctrinal attempts to carve out space for some state control over
state court jurisdiction—through the valid excuse or anti-discrimination norms—are
avenues for the consideration of state interests.73  That such consideration of state in-
terests is anathema to Weinberg is supported by her assertion that every consideration
of state interests in determining the duties that state courts owe to federal law are a
derogation of federal law.74 “[W]hy [should there] be a doctrine of excuse from the
obligation imposed by the Supremacy Clause?”75 Weinberg writes.  “A state can have
66 Id. at 99.
67 Id. at 95.
68 Weinberg, supra note 16, at 1753–54.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1779.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 1775.
73 Id. at 1781–82.
74 Id. at 1783.
75 Id. at 1775.
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no interest—a state can have no want of interest—that makes a difference to its federal
enforcement obligations.”76  Thus, doctrinal attempts to make space for state interest
in jurisdictional authority through the allowance of valid excuse and non-discriminatory
procedural rules are criticized as undercutting the obligation imposed by the Supremacy
Clause.77  Even judicial implementation of constitutional principles of “comity” and
“federalism” are inadequate for adjusting the scope as they are seen by Weinberg as
impermissible judicial amendments to the Supremacy Clause.78
2. Qualified Obligations as the Limits of Power
Even defenders of the Court’s declaration of a qualified state court obligation have
framed their justifications as based on the determination of a constitutional delega-
tion of authority to the national government or a prohibition imposed on the states. 
Through a textualist reading of the Supremacy Clause, and what he argues was the
original understanding of the Clause’s limits, Professor Michael Collins justifies the
doctrinal imposition of only a qualified obligation on state courts as the limit on
national authority.79  Collins argues that nineteenth century thinkers who addressed the
question of state court obligation to federal law were clearly hesitant to impose duties
on state courts that might undermine the recognition of state judicial autonomy or state
authority over its jurisdictional boundaries.80  Collins argues that this hesitance is jus-
tified (and justifiable) because of the Supremacy Clause’s textual distinction between
a state court’s obligation to apply federal law when at issue in state courts and a state
court’s obligation to entertain federal claims outright.81  Collins interprets the qualified
imposition of state court duties—via a nondiscrimination norms—as consistent with
a dual commands reading of the Supremacy Clause.  Collins sees the expansion of
the nondiscrimination norm to include the entertainment command which risks the
practice of  “accommodating the tradition of state court jurisdictional autonomy.”82
What is significant in Collins’s argument for our immediate purposes is the fact
that the judicial hesitance in imposing absolute obligations on state courts is framed
as a concern about either the limits on national power, or the desire to preserve state
power.  The search for the legitimate site of power draws Collins back to the
Supremacy Clause and to the limitations on national commandeering power that he
attempts to justify.83  In short, Collins’s justification of the doctrinal framework that
76 Id. at 1780 (emphasis in original).
77 Id. at 1783–84.
78 Id. at 1784; see also Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO L.J. 53 (1991).
79 Collins, supra note 19, at 143–44.
80 Id. at 103–04.
81 Id. at 77–78. This might be understood as the “dual commands” reading of the Supremacy
Clause. The application command was thought to be the only command necessary for the
vindication of federal law.
82 Id. at 45.
83 Id. at 43–46.
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allows state courts some measure of jurisdictional control is expressed in terms that
define the decision as one involving a determination about the delegation or pro-
hibition of the exercise of authority.84  Any changes in the doctrine simply occur to
maintain the quantum of power originally delegated to the states or to keep the
national government from exercising power beyond its boundaries.  This is evidenced
in Collins’s criticism of the Court’s decision in Testa.85  He argues that the decision
threatened to eradicate the Supremacy Clause’s distinction between a duty to apply
federal law and a duty to entertain federal claims.86  Further it is evidenced in Collins’s
criticism of the Court’s attempt to distinguish legislative and judicial commandeering
case law.87  Collins seems to argue in favor of an almost absolute freedom of state
courts to reject federal claims on the ground that the Supremacy Clause only autho-
rizes the power to commandeer state judges where state judges are called to apply fed-
eral law in place of conflicting state law, and Article III’s establishment of Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions.88
II. BEYOND POWER: FEDERALISM AS RELATIONSHIP
The search for power and prohibitions shapes the analysis of federalism issues
in areas that extend beyond the determination of state duties to federal claims.  This
search defines a significant portion of American federalism enforcement.  This Part
challenges the monopoly that the allocational method has on federalism enforce-
ment.  It begins by offering an overview of American federalism and its enforcement,
84 Id. at 171–72.
85 Id. at 45, 166–70.
86 Id. at 166–70.
87 Id. at 188–94.
88 Id. at 40–42. Professor Vicki Jackson has defended a qualified state court obligation
to federal claims that is not dependent upon locating a specific delegation of authority in the
textual provisions of the Constitution. See Jackson, supra note 7. Rather, Jackson offers a
defense based on a structural reading of the Constitution, particularly the structural role that
state courts play in the constitutional framework. Id. at 119–22. Jackson argues that the
Constitution requires that state courts exist as independent judicial institutions. Id. at 117.
Reasoning from this requirement, Jackson argues that state court independence is embodied
by some recognition of institutional autonomy. Id. at 120–22. Such autonomy is embodied in
state judicial control over its jurisdictional boundaries. Id. Jackson argues that the constitutional
requirement of independent state judiciaries would be undermined by either the imposition
of absolute obligations on state courts to entertain federal disputes or a presumption that state
procedural rules are preempted whenever federal claims are in dispute. Id. at 140. Although
Jackson’s interpretive methodology is distinct from those above, it is not clear that she defines
the question differently than Redish, Weinberg or Collins—as a search for the delegation of
substantive authority.  Structural interpretations have often been employed in searches for
power’s allocation in American constitutional experience. Perhaps the most famous structural
interpretation in American constitutional history is a federalism dispute in which the court
searches for the appropriate site for power between the national and state governments. See
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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as well as the relational model’s place in this framework.  This Part highlights the
Constitution’s creation of institutions that establish the circumstances of repeated,
long-term interactions between the national government and the states.  It will dem-
onstrate how American constitutional history and experience—exemplified in the
constitutional thought of Abraham Lincoln—translate institutional interactions into
an enduring relationship capable of providing normative shape to state and national
interactions by generating behavioral norms to regulate the interactions that the allo-
cation of power cannot.89  Finally, it proposes a norm of “interest inclusion” as a
means of enforcing federalism under the circumstances described herein.
A. Explaining Relational Federalism Enforcement
Why does the federal arrangement require enforcement at all?  Does it serve a
purpose that deserves protection in modern American life?  Some have suggested that,
at least within the modern American context, protections of federalism are a peculiar
“neurosis” in American political and legal culture.90  Others have suggested that the
centrifugal forces of modern American government are so strong that American fed-
eralism, far from being obsolete, has been destroyed.91  Whatever their differences,
these positions suggest that federalism requires no protection, either because it is
useless in modern America or because it has been rendered meaningless and beyond
repair.  This Article challenges both of these positions and contends that a justification
remains for federalism that underwrites the efforts to protect it.  This Article accepts
federalism as a system of governance that gives a larger polity’s geographical sub-
units the ability to articulate alternative substantive norms than those articulated by
the national polity.92  Federalism challenges the national government’s unitary status
89 It is necessary to point out that the relational conception of federalism does not reject
the role, perhaps even dominant role, that allocation plays in framing and shaping national-
state interactions. The argument is not meant to suggest that even interactions or analyses that
I frame as relational are exclusively so. It is meant to highlight the ways in which relational
norms serve as an important explanatory dimension of the constraints that are imposed on the
behavior of both state and national actors which are not best explained by reference to an
allocational conception of federalism enforcement.
90 See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 908 (1994).
91 See ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 13 (2001).
92 This conception of federalism is consistent with various conceptions of federalism as
a structure that allow particular kinds of minorities, whether ethnic, religious, or political, to
exercise a certain level of decisional autonomy over some issues in exchange for joining a
central state. Although some conceptions of federalism are based on a “thick” conception of
identity, such as race, language, or religion, federalism can also be justified on the basis of the
comparatively “thinner” identity of “political loser.” That is, federalism allows political losers
at the national level to have access to a space to articulate alternative or competing norms to
those adopted by the central government. To be clear, federalism’s subunits are not allowed
infinite space to articulate such norms, but federalism provides space from which losers at the
national level might offer alternative norms that contest the norms of the central government.
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as the decider in all things, and serves to open space for differentiation from, and
contestation with, the “center” by those who have failed in their attempts to control
the national government.93  In short, this Article understands federalism as a con-
stitutional structure for fractionating power, primarily for losers at the national level
of government.94
The justification offered here for protections of federalism are different from other
justifications for federalism enforcement.  The idea proffered in this Article clearly
borrows from some of the assumptions of the “states as laboratories” justification that
underwrites most normative conceptions of federalism protection.95  This justification
As can be seen, my disagreement with Professors Rubin and Feeley centers on their justifi-
cation of federalism as necessarily tied to political identities that are thicker than needed. See
Rubin & Feeley, supra note 90, at 942 (connecting separate or divided political identities to
ethnic, linguistic, religious, or cultural differences). Further, federalism can be justified by the
realization that nations continue to be composed of a variety of competing conceptions of “the
Good,” which might be capable of accommodation under a federal structure of government.
This conception of federalism is not premised upon being able to identify ex ante those who
might benefit from some form of regional autonomy because all can conceivably see them-
selves as potential political losers at the national level. Under this conception, federalism is
a structure that prevents contests at the national level from being a “fight for all the marbles,”
in which either side is incentivized to wage “total war” against a particular opponent because
all is either won or lost at the national level. For an insightful discussion of the need for
democratic regimes to take account of the sacrifice of those whose political objectives are not
realized in democratic politics, and sacrifice’s centrality to democracy, see DANIELLE S. ALLEN,
TALKING TO STRANGERS: ANXIETIES OF CITIZENSHIP SINCE BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
25–49 (2004).
93 See Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 66 (2001). Kreimer’s conception of the role that federalism plays in making political con-
testation possible comes close to the idea that I advance. Kreimer argues that the existence
of subunits of the national government with the capacity for at least minimal articulation of
“the existence of alternatives to the authority of the national government can legitimate polit-
ical opposition to repression in ways that would be unattainable in the absence of a diffusion
of political authority.” Id. at 70. Further, he has argued that “the existence of alternative
political visions,” which may be more easily fostered in a federal structure, “makes it more
difficult to demonize and extirpate political dissenters. . . . [This may enable] the platform
for efforts to oust potentially repressive leaders by political means.” Id. Although I accept much
of what Kreimer says, I am uncertain that it is bolstered by the threat of an oppressive national
regime. That is, even a non-repressive regime can benefit from the form of contestation that
federalism makes possible. Its legitimacy need not be premised on the tyrannical potential
of the central government.
94 For a truly insightful description and analysis of shifting constituencies for federalism
in American political history, see Robert A. Schapiro, Not Old or Borrowed: The Truly New
Blue Federalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 33, 33–36 (2009).
95 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”).
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contends that States can serve as laboratories for testing various responses to problems
facing the public and that a certain degree of decision fractioning and autonomy is
valuable because it allows the kind of testing that leads to better resolutions to the
problems that bedevil larger societies.  In addition to the laboratories justification for
federalism is the idea that states serve a function in bringing democracy closer to the
people, who find it easier and more effective to participate in the smaller political units
of state governments than is otherwise possible in a nation as large as the United
States.96  Connected to the political participation justification for federalism is the
political legitimacy argument, which contends that federalism allows for greater citizen
accountability because citizens are closer to their decision makers.97  Finally, each of
these arguments is connected to an encompassing argument that federalism, by divid-
ing sovereign power resists government tyranny.
If federalism is commonly thought to be a valuable structure, why does it require
protection?  Political scientist William Riker has described federalism as a compro-
mise between parties with frustrated ambitions.98  Federalism, for one party in the rela-
tionship, is the result of frustrated imperial ambition to centralize governing authority
under its control.99  For the other party, federalism is the product of the frustrated ambi-
tions for independence from a consolidated political unit.100  Because the federalism
compromise is less than either party’s ideal, each party has incentives to “cheat” on
the compromise—to achieve as much consolidation as possible under the federalism
arrangement, or as much independence as possible—without incurring the backlash
of the other party.101
The Framers recognized federalism’s value, and that there might be incentives to
cheat from the constraints that the federalism structure imposes.  The constitutional
responses to the threats to federalism included both legal to political enforcement.102 
96 See SHAPIRO, supra note 43, at 139.
97 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992); see also SHAPIRO, supra
note 43, at 139.
98 WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 2, 11 (1964).
99 Id. at 3–5, 12.
100 Id. at 12.
101 Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge argue that maintaining federal arrangements is the
goal of enforcing federalism. They contend that all parties to the federal arrangement have in-
centives to “cheat on the federal arrangement” in ways that will undermine it. Jenna Bednar
& William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A Theory of Judicial
Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1472–75 (1995). Using a variation of
the prisoner’s dilemma, they argue that both the national government and the states are incen-
tivized to cheat in their commitment to adhering to the requirements of a federal structure of
government by, for example, the federal government’s aggrandizement by “legislating aggres-
sively and preemptively in areas traditionally left to the states,” or by a state’s failure to partici-
pate in the “implementation and enforcement” of national policies with which it disagrees, or
through the creation of externalities that negatively affect national policy priorities or other
state governments. Id. at 1472–74.
102 See id. at 1449.
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The Framers suggested that the competition between states and federal governments
for the affections of the people would serve as an effective protection for the feder-
alist structure of the government.103  That is, each level of government would possess
only the amount of substantive authority that the people’s trust and affection granted
to it.104  This might be read as implying that the loss of the people’s trust would result
in a diminishment of the possession of substantive authority by a particular level of
government.  Possession of authority by either level, then, could not be guaranteed.
Against the conception that the protection of substantive authority would be up for
grabs, the Constitution also appears to commit to delegations of explicit authority, and
their subsequent separation, as federalism enforcement tools.  From the Republic’s
earliest days, those concerned with protecting the states’ decisional autonomy from
the national government’s usurpation have contended that protecting America’s fed-
eral structure of government is done best by allocating the powers of each government
level.105  At several points throughout American history, the courts have sought to pro-
tect the integrity of the federalism structure by allocating power based on distinctions
between local versus non-local,106 and economic versus non-economic activities.107 
103 Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 332–33 (2003).
104 Id. at 342–44.
105 The Framers responded to criticism that the Constitution would create a central govern-
ment that would trample over the states and make them superfluous in the governance of the
new nation in part by minimizing the threat that the national government would pose to the
states and by arguing that the separation of powers between the two levels of government
would protect the states. Writing in favor of the Constitution’s ratification, Alexander Hamilton
wrote:
It may be said, that it would tend to render the government of the Union
too powerful, and to enable it to absorb in itself those residuary author-
ities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local
purposes. Allowing the utmost latitude to the love of power, . . . I confess
I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons entrusted with
the administration of the general government could ever feel to divest the
States of the authorities of that description. The regulation of the mere
domestic police of a State appears to me to hold out slender allurements
to ambition. Commerce, finance, negociation [sic] and war seem to com-
prehend all the objects, which have charms for minds governed by that
passion; and all the powers necessary to these objects ought in the first
instance to be lodged in the national depository.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 105–06 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
106 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276–77 (1918) (invalidating the Child Labor
Act, which prohibited the interstate transportation of goods produced in factories employing
underage children as exerting power over “purely local matter[s] to which the federal authority
does not extend”), overruled by United States v. Derby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
107 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560–61 (1995) (invalidating portions of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act on the basis that Congress’s Commerce Clause authority over
intrastate activity is limited to “economic activity”).
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Such divisions of power are thought to establish a zone of exclusivity for the national
and state governments.108  The enforcement of fidelity to the federalist structure is
thought to be best achieved by preventing incursions by either level against the terrain
of the other level of government.
In the wake of the post-New Deal transformation of the scope of national power,
the courts significantly reduced their role in federalism enforcement.109  For the most
part, the modern era of American federalism enforcement has been marked by an
almost-exclusive reliance on the political process.  The Supreme Court’s decision in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority110 marked the official declaration
of its abdication of a role in federalism enforcement.
The so-called “federalism revolution”111 that took place during the Rehnquist
Court era marked the Supreme Court’s reassertion of a judicial role in the protection
of America’s federal structure through the placement of constitutional limitations on
national legislative authority.112  The Court’s foray into disputes between the national
108 Id. at 553 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194–95 (1824) (holding
states have the exclusive authority to regulate purely internal commerce)).
109 Between the Court’s decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), and
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court did not overturn a case
involving Congress’s exercise of Commerce power on federalism grounds. For a discussion
of this history, see, MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 36–42 (2003).
110 469 U.S. 528, 547–56 (1985) (holding local transit authorities were required to follow
the mandates of the Fair Labor Standards Act because state sovereign immunity was not
abrogated and overruling National League of Cities).
111 Although the concern for the integrity of states is present in earlier eras in cases like
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53–54 (1971) (holding that federal courts were obligated to
abstain from hearing constitutional claims in cases brought by plaintiffs challenging their
ongoing state criminal prosecutions), the Court’s sensitivity to the states’ interests increased
significantly during the Rehnquist Court in cases like New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 188 (1992) (invalidating a provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
Amendments, which required states to take title to radioactive waste in the absence of a
disposal plan, as an unconstitutional commandeering of the state legislative process). See
also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (holding that the provisions of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act did not apply to state mandatory retirement-age require-
ments for appointed state-court judges absent a clear statutory statement). For a discussion
of these cases as calling for a new form of interaction between the national government and
the states, see Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New
York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 71.
112 The Court’s decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528 (1985), marked the Court’s rejection of a strong judicial presence in the enforcement
of the Constitution’s federal structure. Id. at 557. There, the Court reversed its one-decade old
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which was the first time
since the New Deal that the Court invalidated a congressional statute on federalism grounds.
Id. at 851–52. In Garcia, the Court declared that the political process was a sufficient insti-
tutional enforcer of the Constitution’s federal structure. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552–55; see also
Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism after
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government and the states was marked by an increased suspicion toward the threats
that certain impositions of national-policy priorities posed for the integrity of state gov-
ernments.113  Although the early forays into judicial enforcement of federalism were
primarily aimed at the process, rather than the substance of federalism,114 the Court’s
later federalism decisions invalidated Congress’s substantive exercises of authority
in both United States v. Lopez115 and in United States v. Morrison.116  The Court’s en-
forcement of federalism moved to declare constitutional protection of states from suit
on immunity grounds.117
As stated above, the dominant interpretation of the federalism revolution is that
it has resulted in an allocation of substantive authority away from the national govern-
ment (and its courts) to the states.118  Such an interpretation traffics in the conception
of federalism as exclusively a governance structure that allocates power between the
national government and the states, despite evidence that the Court’s federalism juris-
prudence has also resorted to less absolute mechanisms of enforcing federalism than
mere line drawing.119
Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341, 341–42 (discussing the significance of Garcia in relation
to the Court’s theory of federalism).
113 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (describing the states mandatory retirement system as
“a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity”).
114 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L.
REV. 633, 658 (1993) (describing the anti-commandeering constraints of New York v. United
States as “one of process, not of substance”); see also Rapaczynski, supra note 112, at 359–68
(discussing “process jurisprudence”). For a discussion of the Court’s “process-based” fed-
eralism decisions, see infra Part III.
115 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked the authority to enact
portions of the Gun-Free School Zones Act).
116 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked the authority to enact portions
of the Violence Against Women Act).
117 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75–76 (1996) (holding Congress
cannot statutorily circumvent Florida’s sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment);
see also Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
118 See, e.g., JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION’S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 156 (2002) (describing the Supreme Court’s sovereign immu-
nity case law as ratcheting back the national government’s substantive authority).
119 Scholars have offered different conceptual frameworks for understanding the way in
which the national-state relationship might be understood apart from an allocational method.
Among the most prominent of the “dialogic” conceptions of national and state interaction
has been Professor Robert Schapiro’s attempt to conceptualize federalism as polyphony. See
SCHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 95–97. Schapiro’s conception of federalism as dialogue clearly
rejects federalism enforcement as a search for the location of substantive authority. Id. at
97–98. Rather, polyphonic federalism understands the overlapping nature of state and national
authority. Id. Understood this way, polyphonic federalism appears to offer interaction as the
appropriate governing norm for state and national relationship. Id. It is not always clear whether
polyphony has a vision of the role of the judiciary in enforcing the norm of interaction
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A relational account of federalism enforcement challenges the notion that only the
political enforcements of federalism are legitimate, and the notion that judicial fed-
eralism enforcement must be limited to allocation of substantive power.120  Relational
conceptions of federalism suggest that an incursion on substantive regulatory authority
is not the only way that the federal arrangement can be undermined.121  The federal
arrangement might be undermined even where a particular level of government is
legitimately operating within its sphere of substantive regulatory authority.122  Relying
solely on allocation to enforce fidelity to the federal arrangement fails to adequately
protect the federal structure of government.123
(understood as the avoidance of monophony). Id. at 111–13. This interaction is understood
as providing space for redundancy and differentiation, even if such differentiation is not ulti-
mately protected by the articulation of some right that constrains national authority. Id. The
very participation of states as articulators of substantive norms remains, even where a national
norm might supersede it. Id. at 113–20. One might argue that Schapiro’s polyphony fails to take
seriously the incentives that both sides of the federalism relationship have to cheat and violate
the norms of polyphony, and that its trust of the political process may fail to effectively protect
against this cheating.
120 See SCHAPIRO, supra note 43, at 92–120.
121 See id.
122 For our purposes, a state is clearly recognized as having the authority to pronounce a
death sentence against a criminal defendant who is guilty of having committed a crime eligible
for the death penalty. The state’s unwillingness to perform certain procedural obligations im-
posed on it though various international conventions might be understood as turning on whether
the national government possessed the authority to impose such an obligation, i.e., a deter-
mination of whether the treaty constitutes “binding domestic law” on state institutions—an
allocational method of regulating state and national interaction. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S.
491, 505–06 (2008). Or it might be understood along lines that are more relational. That is, that
in the search for whether the treaty can bind states (a search for the site of sovereign power),
the analysis might be better understood as one involving a consideration of the respective state
and national interests at stake in the state’s decision not to adhere to a process to which the
national government has agreed for foreign affairs purposes. See Medellín, 552 U.S. 491
(holding that the International Court of Justice’s decision on the Vienna Convention provision
requiring states to inform foreign nationals of rights under the Convention did not apply in state
court for the purpose of affecting post-conviction habeas petitions without further domestic
legislation). From the opposite but related perspective, one might say that the search for ulti-
mate national sovereign authority in the area of foreign affairs preemption might be better
understood in relational terms as a consideration of the interests of both states and the national
government’s foreign affairs interests. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
366 (2000) (invalidating a Massachusetts statute prohibiting state purchases from companies
doing business with Burma as violative of the national government’s foreign affairs power).
123 Relational conceptions of federalism might be profitably analogized to the anti-aggran-
dizement principle articulated in separation-of-power jurisprudence. For example, in Weiss v.
United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the appoint-
ments process of military trial judges. Id. at 165. Military trial judges were to be appointed
from among the ranks of already-commissioned officers. Id. at 168. They had been appointed
pursuant to the Appointments Clause but did not receive a second appointment to the office of
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B. The Constitution and Enduring Relationship
The Constitution establishes institutional structures so pervasive and interrelated
that the consequence of the establishment of a web of relationships is almost un-
mistakable.  Through the construction of the Congress, the Presidency, and other
institutions and structures, which are significantly influenced by state actors, the
Constitution establishes the framework for repeated interactions between the states
and the national government.124
military trial judge. Id. at 170. The lack of a second appointment was challenged as a violation
of the Appointments Clause requirements. Id. at 165. The Court determined that the statute
providing for their appointment was not unconstitutional, in part, because it concluded that
Congress had not attempted to aggrandize power to itself at the expense of the President by
endowing previously appointed officers with additional duties. Id. at 188–91 (Souter, J.,
concurring). Similarly, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986), the Court upheld the constitutionality of non-Article III judges entertaining common-
law suits, in part, because it concluded that Congress was not attempting to undermine Article III
courts. Id. at 854–55.
124 Even if one were convinced of the argument that the original Constitution creates an en-
during relationship between the national government and the states, one might contend that the
Civil War and Reconstruction, particularly the Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution,
radically transformed the nature of the relationship. There can be no question that the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments enlarged the substantive authority of the national gov-
ernment to cure the wrongs related to slavery, racial discrimination, and the systematic denial of
the right to vote of freed slaves. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XV. Indeed, the Amendments
have been rightly interpreted to have endowed Congress with the authority to cure wrongs
that go beyond slavery or to protect classes of people other than blacks. See, e.g., Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (holding strict scrutiny must be applied to all racial classifi-
cations even in a prison setting where administrators are usually given deference); United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (declaring unconstitutional the prohibition on women attend-
ing the Virginia Military Institute); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432
(1985) (concluding a city ordinance specifically targeting the mentally disabled fails to survive
even a rational basis inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating racial segregation in public schools). The argument for an endur-
ing relationship between the national government and the states is no less applicable after the
Reconstruction and New Deal era changes in the conception of national authority. See, e.g.,
Jackson, supra note 7, at 122–23 (pointing to the states as the audience of the Fourteenth
Amendment to support the assertion that state governments and judiciaries remain important
in the constitutional framework during the Reconstruction era). The central contention of rela-
tional federalism is that whatever the substance of national authority after the Reconstruction
and New Deal “revolutions,” the exercise of such expanded authority cannot be used in a way
that completely negates the fact that an enduring relationship continues to exist. There can be
no doubt that the duty owed to state governments acting in ways fundamentally hostile to the
vindication of the constitutional rights of persons in the United States is transformed by such
action. But even where state governments might be presumed to be bad-faith actors, a relational
conception of federalism suggests that they cannot be deemed permanent pariahs. That is, rogue
states are treated badly, and rightly so, in the hope that they might be transformed into regimes
that are respectful of constitutional guarantees. See infra Part II.C. (Lincoln discussion); see
also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY
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Article I of the United States Constitution establishes the national legislative
body, and is the initial, and perhaps most important, embodiment of the relationship
that is inaugurated between the states and the national government in the constitutional
text.125  After Article I, Section 1’s vesting of “all legislative Powers” in two houses
of Congress—the House of Representatives and the Senate126—the text immediately
describes the qualifications for membership in each chamber, and the method by which
representatives will be chosen.127  The state governments are inextricably linked to
each of these.  The member of the House of Representatives are to be chosen “every
second Year by the People of the several States . . . .”128  In order to be qualified to
serve in the House of Representatives, a member must “be an Inhabitant of that State
in which he shall be chosen.”129  The members of the House are distributed “among
the several States,” based on the state’s population.130  Each state is guaranteed at
least one representative in the House of Representatives.131
Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution establishes the second chamber of the
national legislature—the Senate.132  Each state, regardless of population, is repre-
sented by two members, each of whom was chosen by the state’s legislature.133  Like
members of the House of Representatives, to be qualified to represent a state in the
Senate, a member must be “an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”134 
Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution delegates to the states the authority to estab-
lish the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Repre-
sentatives . . . .”135  The text reserves to Congress the authority to “make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.”136
As with the selection of members of the Congress of the United States, the states
play an indispensible role in the selection of the President.  Article II, Section 1 estab-
lishes the manner in which the President is elected.137  Each state receives an elector
for every member of the Senate and House of Representatives in Congress.138  The
original Constitution required that electors would meet in their respective states to
L. REV. 605, 635 (1981). I thank my colleague Stephen Schnably for forcing me to consider
the implications of this issue.
125 U.S. CONST. art. I.
126 Id. § 1.
127 Id. §§ 2–4.
128 Id. § 2, cl. 1.
129 Id. cl. 2.
130 Id. cl. 3.
131 Id.
132 Id. § 3.
133 Id. cl. 1.
134 Id. cl. 3.
135 Id. § 4, cl. 1.
136 Id.
137 Id. art. II, § 1.
138 Id. cl. 2.
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cast votes for two candidates for President.139  These votes were required to be tallied
and transmitted to the nation’s capitol, after which they would be opened in a proceed-
ing involving the sitting Vice President (as President of the Senate).140  The person
having the greatest number of votes would be elected President, if that number con-
stituted a majority of the total number of electors.141
As the Constitution establishes, states play a central role in the selection of the
holders of every democratically accountable institution of the national government. 
The constitutional provisions below provide additional support that the Constitution
inaugurates a relationship between the states and the national government, which is
evidenced by the affirmative obligations and constraints imposed on the national
government and the states, which protect both national unity and distinct political
communities.
Article I, Section 9, Clause 6 of the Constitution, while not directly related to the
establishment of Congress as an institutional structure, prohibits the national govern-
ment from creating favored trading zones or erecting barriers to trade that might
negatively affect the free flow of commerce between and among the states, and from
creating classes of less favored states within the national economic system.142
The Constitution imposes an affirmative obligation on the national government
to guarantee to every state a “Republican Form of Government.”143  Though the Court
held that the Guarantee Clause was non-justiciable,144 it has played an important role
in American constitutional structure, serving as the basis of the Court’s vindication of
the Reconstruction Acts after the Civil War.145  However, more recently the Court’s
“federalism revival” seemed to suggest a special concern for the political status of
state governments,146 and scholars identified the Guarantee Clause as the source of
a national obligation to refrain from compromising state political integrity.147
There is also a certain irrefutability of the national-state relationship that might
plausibly be drawn from Article V’s substantive limitation on the amendment power.148 
Article V prohibits any constitutional amendment that would deprive a state of equal
representation in the Senate.149
139 See id. cl. 3 (amended 1804).
140 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
141 Id.
142 Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 6.
143 Id. art. IV, § 4.
144 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
145 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 729–32 (1869), overruled in part by Morgan
v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885).
146 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–83 (1992).
147 See Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34 (1988).
148 U.S. CONST. art. V. Constitutional scholar Lynn Baker has argued that Article V is in-
structive for its assertion of a protection of some core existence of state autonomy. Lynn A.
Baker, Federalism: The Argument From Article V, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 923, 946–52 (1997).
149 U.S. CONST. art. V.
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C. Abraham Lincoln: The Union as Enduring Relationship
The Constitution’s establishment of structures that require the participation of
states in the establishment of the national government, alongside other provisions,
ground the claim of enduring relationship in the constitutional text.  However, the
claim of enduring relationship can also be supported on the basis of the theories of the
American polity arising from the most profound challenge to the American union—the
Civil War.  Abraham Lincoln offers one of the most significant conceptions of the
enduring nature of the American union in American constitutionalism.150  Moreover,
Lincoln articulated a conception of enduring relationship as justifying behavioral
norms in national-state interaction.151
No examination of the larger meaning of the relationship between the national
government and the states can avoid the significant impact that Abraham Lincoln’s
thought continues to play in our thoughts about federalism.152  At the dawn of the Civil
War, Lincoln rejected the legitimacy of the Confederacy on the ground that the Union
was perpetual.  In defense of the perpetuity of the Union, Lincoln declared:
I hold, that in contemplation of universal law, and of the
Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual.  Perpetuity
150 For recent scholarly treatment of Lincoln’s constitutional thought, see AKHIL REED
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 51–53 (2005); DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S
CONSTITUTION 30 (2003); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION: HOW LINCOLN
REDEFINED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2001) (arguing that the Civil War and Reconstruction era
inaugurated a second constitution, which included the heightened sense of nationhood); Akhil
Reed Amar, The David C. Baum Lecture: Abraham Lincoln and the American Union, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 1109; see also ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 77–102
(1992) (drawing upon Lincoln’s political conception of equality to make an argument against
judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation).
151 This is not to suggest that all of Lincoln’s behavioral norms were appropriate for the
challenges that the nation faced either during or after the Civil War. I would argue that Lincoln
was very slow to accept the fact that the newly freed slaves would require protection from the
defeated Confederates, who were unwilling to accept the consequences of their military defeat.
However, to suggest that Lincoln’s calculations were likely inaccurate does not suggest that his
relational model was wrong. The relational model is empirical to the extent that it is capable
of responding to changing circumstances, indeed the model springs from changed circum-
stances surrounding federalism enforcement. This responsive quality allows relational fed-
eralism enforcement to shift to accommodate its assessment of the ability of state governments
to vindicate national supremacy (in this specific instance—the anti-slavery norm of the post-
Civil War period) as it assesses what the national-state relationship requires. Nevertheless, it
is always conscious of state existence, and stands ready to continue to test state ability to vin-
dicate federal rights norms. For a discussion of this in the context of federal courts doctrine,
see infra Parts IV.A.2–3 (abstention discussion).
152 See HERMAN BELZ, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND EQUAL RIGHTS IN
THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1998).
536 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 19:511
is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national
governments.  It is safe to assert that no government proper, ever
had a provision in its organic law for its own termination.  Con-
tinue to execute all the express provisions of our national Consti-
tution, and the Union will endure forever—it being impossible to
destroy it, except by some action not provided for in the instru-
ment itself.
. . . .
Descending from these general principles, we find the proposi-
tion that, in legal contemplation, the Union is perpetual, confirmed
by the history of the Union itself. . . .
But if destruction of the Union, by one, or by a part only, of
the States, be lawfully possible, the Union is less perfect than be-
fore Constitution, having lost the vital element of perpetuity.153
Lincoln’s cognizance of the significance of the enduring quality of the federal-
state bond did not prevent him from acting against states to preserve the substantive
value commitments for which federalism (of whatever variety) is a structural support. 
Moreover, Lincoln’s framing of the Civil War as a conflict in whose advancement
both the South and the North were complicit suggests a normative commitment to
respect for the bond that the Union has fought to vindicate, even in light of the con-
straints that such respect placed on the national government.154  Similarly, Lincoln’s
framing of the Reconstruction of the Union also embodies a respect for the relationship
between the national government and the former Confederate states.155  Regarding the
153 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861), reprinted in SELECTED
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS BY ABRAHAM LINCOLN 284, 286–87 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed.,
1st Vintage Books, Library of America ed., 1992) [hereinafter LINCOLN].
154 Lincoln attempts to recreate a union between the North and the South in their connected
complicity in the evil of slavery, saying:
Both [the North and the South] read the same Bible, and pray to the same
God; and each invokes His aid against the other. It may seem strange
that any men should dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their
bread from the sweat of other men’s faces; but let us judge not that we be
not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered; that of neither
has been answered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes. “Woe
unto the world because of offences! For it must needs be that offences
come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh!” If we shall
suppose that American Slavery is one of those offences which, in the
providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued
through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives
to both North and South, this terrible war, as the woe due to those by
whom the offence came . . . .
Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (March 4, 1865), reprinted in LINCOLN, supra
note 153, at 449, 450.
155 KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865–1877, at 48 (1965).
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re-inclusion of Louisiana into the Union, Lincoln debated those within the Republican
Party about whether the national government would support the new Louisiana gov-
ernment, Lincoln stated:
[The Louisiana] Legislature has already voted to ratify the [Thir-
teenth A]mendment . . . abolishing slavery throughout the nation. 
[The state is] thus fully committed to the Union, and to perpetual
freedom in the state—committed to the very things, and nearly all
the things the nation wants—and they ask the nations recognition,
and it’s [sic] assistance to make good their committal.  Now, if we
reject, and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize and dis-
perse them.  We in effect say to the white men “You are worth-
less, or worse—we will neither help you, nor be helped by you.” 
To the blacks we say “This cup of liberty which these, your old
masters, hold to your lips, we will dash from you, and leave you
to the chances of gathering the spilled and scattered contents in
some vague and undefined when, where, and how.”  If this course,
discouraging and paralyzing both white and black, has any ten-
dency to bring Louisiana into proper practical relations with the
Union, I have, so far, been unable to perceive it.156
What Lincoln attempts to articulate is the centrality of trustworthiness to the relation-
ship between the North and South after the Civil War.157 The enduring nature of the
Union demands that the national government and the states become worthy of the
trust of the other. The development of the habits that inculcate trustworthiness is central
to the future success of the American democratic project. The above statement appears
aimed at bolstering the foundation of trustworthiness of a former Confederate state.
While the failure of the project of Reconstruction undermines the faith that Lincoln
placed in Louisiana, it is clear that Lincoln recognized the centrality of Louisiana’s
156 Abraham Lincoln, Speech on Reconstruction (April 11, 1865), reprinted in LINCOLN,
supra note 153, at 454, 457; see also JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE
CIVIL WAR 15–31 (1961); STAMPP, supra note 155, at 24–49.
157 Political theorist Danielle Allen has argued that trust is an essential component to the
proper functioning of a democratic regime. Allen focused on the problem of interracial distrust
in American political culture. ALLEN, supra note 92, at xiii–xxii, 143–59. However, her argu-
ments might be applied with profit to the relationship between the national government and the
states at various times in American history, the period of the Civil War being the most promi-
nent age of antagonism in between the two levels of government. If we take seriously the idea,
stated above, that both the national government and the state has incentives to “cheat” in a
federal relationship, it is not hard to imagine that the maintenance of the relationship depends,
in no small part, on the capacity of both the national government and the states to establish
themselves as trustworthy. Lincoln’s recognition of the collective “sin” of the Union in his
Second Inaugural Address is intended to establish the ground upon which both the “free” and
former slaveholding states might see the other as capable of proving themselves to be worthy
of the trust of the other. See supra note 153.
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transformation to the development of national-state relations in a post-Civil War
world. Louisiana’s capacity for trustworthiness would place demands on the national
government to act in ways that would likewise demonstrate its own trustworthiness in
the national-state relationship. Lincoln affirms that the development of practices and
habits might serve as the foundation upon which mutual trust could be established in
national-state interaction in the post-Civil War world.
D. From Relationship to Norm: German Federalism Enforcement
Numerous comparisons between the practice of judicial federalism enforcement
in Germany and its American counterpart have been made by federalism scholars in
recent years.158  Among the leading commentators is Professor Daniel Halberstam,
who contrasts the two forms of federalism enforcement as the “fidelity” approach and
the “entitlement” approach, respectively.159  The fidelity approach is marked by its
attention to the duties that each level of government owes to the proper functioning of
the governmental system as a whole, without special regard for the locus of substantive
regulatory authority.160  By contrast, the “entitlement” approach enforces federalism
similar to its declarations of individual rights, which are deployed “without regard to
whether the exercise . . . serves the system of democratic governance as a whole.”161 
Although this Article evidences an attempt to highlight the “fidelity” dimensions of
American federalism enforcement, an analysis of German federalism enforcement
is important as a model of how the judiciary translates from a governmental system
(read: enduring relationship) to a behavioral norm that serves to analytically organize
its enforcement of federalism commitments.
The German Federal Constitutional Court first articulated the principle of pro-
federal comity, Bundestreue,162 in the Housing Funding case in 1952.163  The principle
158 See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility: The Political Morality of
Federal Systems, 90 VA. L. REV. 731, 817–32 (2004) [hereinafter Halberstam, Of Power and
Responsibility]; Daniel Halberstam & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., State Autonomy in Germany
and the United States, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 173 (2001); Vicki C.
Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience,
51 DUKE L.J. 223, 269–71 (2001) [hereinafter Jackson, Narratives]. For skepticism about the
use of comparative constitutional decisions on justifying judicial federalism enforcement, see
Mark Tushnet, Judicial Enforcement of Federalist-Based Constitutional Limitations: Some
Skeptical Comparative Observations, 57 EMORY L.J. 135 (2007).
159 Halberstam, Of Power and Responsibility, supra note 158, at 732–34.
160 Id. at 734.
161 Id. at 733.
162 The term is a combination of the word Bund, meaning form of federation, and the word
Treue, meaning trust or faith. Thus Bundestreue is an duty to “keep faith” with the fed-
eration, which obligates both the states and the federal government to respect the other level
of governmental authority. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 69 (2d ed. 1997).
163 Id. (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1952,
1 ENTSCHEDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 299).
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is not a part of the text of Germany’s Basic Law.164  According to Donald Kommers,
the court has inferred the duty of fidelity based upon “the various structures and re-
lationships created by the Constitution.”165  The court has pressed the principle into
service in several cases in the intervening years, in areas such as state duty to honor fed-
eral treaties,166 administrative commands from the federal government to the Länder
(states),167 and the subsidization of the poorer states by wealthier states.168
The Kalkar II Case serves as a paradigmatic example of the court’s Bundestreue
principle.  Kalkar rose from a dispute over conflicting federal and state administrative
directives regarding measures to ensure the safety of nuclear reactors.169  Pursuant to
the Basic Law, the states, or Länder, are authorized to administer federal law as agents
of the federal government.170  The conflict stemmed from the state minister’s issuance
of a directive that required the reassessment of the nuclear plant’s safety system before
permitting construction on the nuclear reactor.171  The federal minister issued a con-
trary directive, ordering the construction to begin without a safety assessment of the
nuclear reactor.172  The Court did not hesitate to declare that the federal government
had extraordinary power over the state governments to guide their actions over the
administration of state law.173  Nevertheless, the Court declared that in the exercise
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Concordat Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
1957, 6 ENTSCHEDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 309, translated
in KOMMERS, supra note 162, at 80 (holding that the Länder (states) owed a profederal duty
to the federal government’s ability to enter into a treaty with the Holy See concerning the
provision of religious education in state-supported schools, despite the Länder’s exclusive
authority in this substantive area).
167 Kalkar II Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
1990, 81 ENTSCHEDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 310, translated
in KOMMERS, supra note 162, at 84.
168 KOMMERS, supra note 162, at 90–91 (citing Finance Equalization I Case, Bundesver-
fassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 1952, 1 ENTSCHEDUNGEN DES
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 299).
169 Concern over the safety of Germany’s nuclear reactors was provoked by the Chernobyl
disaster in the Soviet Union. See KOMMERS, supra note 162, at 84.
170 Under a separate provision, the states are empowered to implement federal laws with
greater freedom. Kommers writes, “Under Article 84 the Länder are empowered to implement
federal laws as a matter of their own concern, in accord with their own procedures, and through
their own agencies unless otherwise provided with the Bundesrat’s consent.” KOMMERS, supra
note 162, at 83.
171 Id. at 84.
172 Id.
173 Kalkar II Case, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court]
1990, 81 ENTSCHEDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 310, translated
in KOMMERS, supra note 162, at 84–85.
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of even these extraordinary powers, the federal government was “bound by a duty
of reciprocal loyalty.”174  The Court further declared,
Certain conditions and restrictions for the execution of compe-
tences can be derived from this.  In the German federal state the
entire constitutional relationship between the federal government
and its member Länder is guided by the unwritten constitutional
principle of a duty of reciprocal loyalty; that is, the federal gov-
ernment and the Länder must act in a manner that promotes the
[interests of the] federation [as a whole].  This duty requires that in
exercising their functions, the federal government and the Länder
reasonably consider the overrall interests of the federation and the
concerns of the Länder.  The federal government does not violate
its duty solely by executing a constitutionally assigned compe-
tence.  Rather, it can be deduced from the principle that the exer-
cise must be abusive or in violation of procedural requirements.175
Here the Court’s decision is clearly not one of allocation, as it respects the
allocation that the constitution makes regarding the substantive authority to preempt
state implementations of certain federal laws.  Nevertheless, the Court imposes a
behavioral norm that constrains the exercise of federal authority generated from the
obligations of the relationship between the federal government and the states.
E. Interest Inclusion: The Norm of Enduring Relationship
The comparative discussion of Germany’s experience with a relational enforce-
ment of federalism provides us with a fuller conception of how the ethical dimension
of relationship is translated into particular behavioral norms.  The question for us is
what behavioral norm is generated by the enduring national-state relationship for the
relational enforcement of American federalism.  The answer to this question must be
a norm that is consistent with the ethical implications of an enduring relationship that
is committed to the generation of trust.  This Part articulates a norm of interest inclu-
sion.176  It relies on an elaboration of the moral dimension of relationality as articulated
in feminist theoretical literature, including feminist legal theory.177
174 Id. at 86.
175 Id.
176 I do not suggest that interest inclusion is the only acceptable behavioral norm that might
be consistent with a relational account of relational federalism enforcement. In fact, in a dis-
cussion of German federalism enforcement pursuant to the Bundestreue principal, Vicki C.
Jackson has suggested the possibility of “anti-discrimination” as a norm of American fed-
eralism enforcement that is reminiscent of the relational conception. In Jackson’s description
of American federalism enforcement, however, her primary focus is on legislative federalism.
See Jackson, Narratives, supra note 158, at 245–86.
177 See ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 33 (1997) (describing relational feminist
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Feminist scholars, responding to their exclusion from the realms of “political”
(understood as rational) moral discernment, claimed the modes of moral reasoning that
had been bequeathed to the domestic sphere and to them as no less a part of the moral
activity than more “public” or “political” counterparts.178  These scholars turned to the
spaces of women’s everyday lives and engagements as the most appropriate sites of
articulating and justifying women’s capacity for moral reasoning.179  Rather than fight-
ing for admission into a male-dominated sphere of the agora, feminist theorists sought
to “redeem” the spaces and interactions in which their activities were most concen-
trated.180  Among the most prominent voices in this intellectual movement has been
psychologist Carol Gilligan, who has articulated a conception of a “difference voice”
feminism or epistemology, which advocated an alternative form of moral discernment
that she described as uniquely feminine.181  Difference voice feminism recognized a
“conception of morality [ ] concerned with the activity of care” in addition “to a con-
ception of morality as fairness.”182  The moral activity of care arose from women’s
unique valuation of the embedded nature of their lives and experiences in relationship
with others, as opposed to the autonomous, individuated self of liberal moral theory
and its attendant obsession with justice.183
What does such a “caring” activity require?  Without going too far beyond the
scope of this discussion, I focus on what I take to be a central component of an “ethic
of care” proposed by relational feminist thought.184  The significance of this ethic
stems from its value conceptualizing the moral dimension of the navigation of rela-
tionships from which we cannot easily free ourselves.  Relational feminism argues that
an ethic of care encompasses the practice of considering the interests of the other as
a separate, though connected, entity without an attempt to reduce the other’s interests
to our own.185  Translated for our purposes, this becomes an affirmative obligation both
to recognize the moral dimension of relationship,186 and to act consistent with caring
conception of caregiving as moral activity); see also WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 398–99 (2002).
178 For a discussion of the separation of men’s and women’s “spheres,” see NANCY F. COTT,
THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: “WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW ENGLAND 1780–1835, at 197–206
(1977); JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT (2d ed. 1993).
179 See COTT, supra note 178, at 69.
180 Id. at 70.
181 CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S
DEVELOPMENT 69 (1982).
182 Id. at 19.
183 See also Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 604–05 (1986) (arguing that female judges generally pay closer
attention to community and relationship than male justices, who give greater weight to rules).
184 See GILLIGAN, supra note 181, at 173.
185 See KYMLICKA, supra note 177, at 272–73.
186 For an insightful discussion of this dimension of relationships, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 11–16 (1993).
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for and maintaining the relationship.187  The maintenance of the relationship requires
that the other never be reduced or transformed into the self in order for moral recog-
nition to be accorded.  Yet, it also obligates the self to an appropriate level of care for
the self and its interests, while not equating care for one’s own interest into a license
to separate from the relationship.188
Relational feminist thought assists us in recognizing the components of behavior
capable of demonstrating the capacity for trustworthiness central to the maintenance
of the relationship instantiated by America's federal structure. Behavioral norms indi-
cate both states and the national government have an affirmative obligation to at least
act consistent with the fact that they exist in relation to one another; they are connected
to one another, and this fact matters in shaping (constraining) their actions.189  This
does not mean—and indeed likely resists—the notion that federalism’s structure is
static rather than dynamic and changing.  A relational account of federalism is not
resistant to the necessity of enlarged national power at several important moments in
American history, or the fundamental changes in the constitutional structure of federal-
ism wrought by the Civil War and Reconstruction period.190  Nevertheless, federalism
187 See, e.g., Linda C. McClain, “Atomistic Man” Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and
Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1171, 1206 (1992) (analogizing John Rawls’s
concept of the capacity for a conception of the good with feminist morality).
188 One must recognize the risk of translating the dynamics and interactions of human rela-
tionships into institutional frameworks; it is very clear that the conceptions of “self” and the
“other” in feminist theoretical discourse of relationality may not have the same coherent or
stable identity when they are transformed into political communities. Yet, the insight of fem-
inist theory’s recognition of the duties of relationships that are embedded in contexts that are
larger than any single activity can illuminate our consideration of interactions of the national
and state governments in the context of American federalism.
189 Clearly there are limits to the obligation to maintain relationships that are meant to be
enduring over long periods of time. I do not mean to suggest that relational federalism would
result in a person remaining in a relationship that was abusive or damaging to their physical
or psychological well-being. For a helpful discussion of these issues from a relational feminist
perspective, see Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 YALE L.J. 1459
(2001) (reviewing ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING
(2000)). Neither am I suggesting that maintaining the federal structure of government is the
highest commitment to fidelity to the larger project of American constitutionalism, which
clearly commits to other goods that are rightly deemed to be more paramount than any com-
mitment to federalism. That is, we are right to regard those who advocated secession in protest
to slavery differently from those who advocated secession as a defense of slavery. What I mean
is that whatever substantive decision is reached, and the wrong decision can be reached, the
decision likely cannot be reached without the consideration of the rupture of relationship. Its
value might be wholly negative and destructive, but its rupture is not inconsequential.
190 Contrary to many conceptions of federalism, a relational account of federalism does
not attempt to stand outside or beyond history. In fact, the content of what is possible in the
national-state relationship is informed by specific historical incidents. There is no possible
way to conceive of many of the expansions of national legislative and judicial authority with-
out taking into account the fact that transformative political, economic, social and cultural
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as an enduring relationship obligates each sphere of government to take into account
the interests of the other in the exercise authority.  On this account, federalism entails
an affirmative obligation to include the interests of the other sphere of government,
and the larger interests of maintaining federalism as a constitutional structure.191
The interactions of the federal and state judiciaries is a complex web, and no par-
ticular dispute between the two adjudicative systems can ever be thought to stand in
for the entirety of the various interactions that take place between them.  The recogni-
tion of this fact is central to understanding the dynamic that exists between federal
and state judicial systems, and the ways in which several judicial doctrines designed
to regulate their interaction exemplify relational practices.  What is unacceptable in
a conception of federalism as an enduring relationship is rupture—understood as the
freedom to exclude the interests of the other from consideration.  Understood this way,
there are two primary threats to federalism as relationship—the exclusion of interests
that is the result of the conclusion that there is nothing distinct between one’s own in-
terests and those of the other, such that the interests are synonymous, and the exclusion
of interests as a result of the conclusion that self and the other are ineradicably distant.
transformations would have occurred throughout American history. For an insightful discussion
of this aspect of federal courts law and federalism jurisprudence, see Susan Bandes, Erie and
the History of One True Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829 (2001) (reviewing EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER
AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000), and
rejecting the law’s trans-historical conception of federalism). See also EDWARD A. PURCELL,
JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE: A
HISTORICAL INQUIRY (2007) (exploring the evolution of federalism throughout American
history, and rejecting the notion of an “original” version of federalism as capable of guiding
current controversies).
191 This is not meant to suggest that the maintenance of the federal system of fractionated
power is ever, or always, the paramount consideration in constitutional adjudication. There
might be very good reasons—commitments to racial, gender, or religious equality or commit-
ments to the effective ability of the polity to respond in the face of crises—why an inflexible
commitment to a federalist structure without any interrogation into the consequences that attend
particular practices creates exactly the sort of sterile conceptions of federalism as have attended
the search for state and national sovereignty. As will be discussed in more detail in Part IV,
infra, the Court’s abstention and appellate review doctrines responded to changes in its deter-
minations about whether state courts could be trusted to vindicate federal law. The variation in
responses does not violate what I understand to be relational federalism enforcement. However,
it does suggest that doctrinal expansions of federal court oversight should not simply be taken
for granted over long periods of time without additional “testing” of the accuracy of the em-
pirical claim. For a recent example of exactly this sort of reconsideration, see Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009) (upholding section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act, but calling into question the operation of preclearance requirements under changed
circumstances). This opinion was joined by every member of the Court, save Justice Clarence
Thomas. For a discussion of the constitutional challenges to the Voting Rights Act in the
present era, see Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of its Own
Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (2004).
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III. IMPLEMENTING CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM
The  call for a relational model of federalism enforcement must respond to two
broad challenges.  To the extent that it remains a call for the judicial enforcement of
federalism values, it is vulnerable to challenges to any judicial enforcement of fed-
eralism.  Further, relational federalism enforcement is also vulnerable to Textualist
assertions that all judicial enforcement of federalism ought to be limited to the explicit
constitutional provisions that regulate state-national interaction.192  Contrary to these
arguments, this Part contends that judicial federalism enforcement legitimately in-
volves more than merely determining whether authority is possessed by a particular
unit of government but may extend to the declaration of behavioral norms that apply
to legitimately possessed authority.  This Part seeks to justify this practice as a legiti-
mate implementation of constitutional meaning.193
This Part begins with a description of the forms of judicial decision making that
exemplify the judicial practice of constitutional implementation inspired by federalism
values not directly attributable to the constitutional text.  Further, this Part will defend
this form of constitutional implementation against its critics.
A. Articulating Federalism-Based Constraints
The recognition of a judicial role in the relational enforcement of constitutional
federalism is not unusual if one thinks of this judicial activity as analogous to other
attempts to regulate the interaction between states and the national government.  This
suggestion recognizes the extent to which the federal courts, over the last several gener-
ations, have attempted to mediate national and state interaction while avoiding a decla-
ration of the constitutional invalidity of Congress’s substantive policy objective.  This
has been especially so in the wake of the Court’s decision in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,194 which effectively declared the judicial attempt to
192 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (regulating election of senators); id. § 8 (delegating
powers to Congress); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (detailing the power of the judiciary to hear cases);
id. art. VI, § 2 (Supremacy Clause).
193 The cases that I discuss in this Part are generally cases that are protective of the interests
of state autonomy and independence from national regulatory control. This should not be inter-
preted to mean that the enforcement of federalism values is exclusively about the protection
of state interests. As I have written, federalism is best understood as a relationship in tension
between unity and separation. Federalism is not always best understood in terms of state
autonomy from the dictates of national authority. See Copeland, supra note 27, at 843 (describ-
ing an alternate view of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), under a relational model of
federalism). Understood in this way, we can easily include the Court’s development of the
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine as judicial policymaking in the service of the interests of
a national community. Within the context of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, and states’
duties to the national union, states cannot discriminate against outsiders in favor of insiders.
194 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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carve out zones of protected state activity a dead project.195  However, the Court has
not allowed the death of dual federalism—and its progeny—to completely annihilate
the judicial role in federalism enforcement.  In Garcia’s wake, judicial oversight of
state and national interaction has taken the form of process-based constraints that
appear to increase the marginal cost of expanding governmental authority where state
interests might be implicated.196  Such process-based constraints have avoided drawing
lines around certain sets of state authority as off limits to national regulatory author-
ity.197  The examples that follow provide models of the implementation of constitu-
tional values aimed at protecting the federal structure of American government.
1. Clear Statement Principles and State Integrity
One of the primary tasks of judicial decision making is the determination of
statutory meaning.198  As scholars of statutory interpretation argue, the interpretation
of a statute’s meaning often involves divining congressional intention from unclear
texts.199  As repeat players in the statutory interpretation game, it is often beneficial for
courts to articulate default rules of textual interpretation capable of eliciting congres-
sional preferences with regard to particular decisions.200  Clear statement rules are a
species of default principles intended to elicit the preferences of the parties responsible
for statutory enactments.  Statutory clear statement principles are often aimed to force
explicit identification of the parties’ intention regarding some value deemed to be
important in shaping the context in which those who enacted the statute acted.201
195 See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 38–49 (1995)
(describing Garcia as endorsing an “abdication model” and National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833 (1976), as endorsing an “enclave model” of judicial federalism enforcement).
196 Surely this has not been the exclusive judicial response as anyone familiar with the
Court’s decisions in Lopez and Morrison can attest. For a critique of these cases as a return to
the era of dual federalism, see generally SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM, supra note 28,
at 54–91.
197 For example, the Court’s expansive interpretation of Congress’s Commerce power in
the post-New Deal constitutional era was marked by the Court’s articulation of doctrines that
limited the preemptive effect of Congress’s exercise of substantive regulatory authority. See
Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 806–07 (1994).
198 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982)
(describing the “statutorification” of American law).
199 On the search for legislative intention in statutory interpretation, see Max Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 869–72 (1930).
200 See, e.g., EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION 4–5 (2008).
201 Federalism need not be the only value to inspire clear statement rules. Clear statement
rules have been articulated in courts’ interpretation of ambiguous criminal statutes, which are
interpreted in favor of criminal defendants. The rule of lenity aims to protect individual rights
as significant enough to require explicit congressional declarations where such rights would
be limited. For a detailed discussion of various clear statement rules beyond those discussed
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In recent years the Court has articulated clear statement principles that are inspired
by a desire to protect what the Court has deemed to be core values of federalism.202 
The Court’s announcement of a federalism-inspired clear statement principle serves
the function of forcing Congress to explicitly declare its intentions where it enacts
statutes that might impose burdens on state governments that appear to impair state
autonomy.203  For example, in Gregory v. Ashcroft,204 the Court addressed the issue of
whether the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) applied to state judges
in Missouri, who were obligated to retire upon reaching the age of seventy.205  Despite
the fact that the ADEA’s substantive provisions had been explicitly extended to in-
clude states as employers, it also excluded elected and high-ranking government state
officials from the statute’s protection.206  The Gregory Court clearly concludes that
“[t]he extension of the ADEA to employment by state and local governments was
a valid exercise of Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause.”207  However, the
Court describes what it declares to be a potential constitutional problem even in light
of Congress’s apparent constitutional authority.  The Court concluded that the exten-
sion of the ADEA’s provisions to protect state employees threatened to undermine the
authority of a political community to “determine the qualifications of their government
officials.”208  However, like a Shakespearean play, the Court reaches out and grasps
the rope that operates the escape hatch that frees it from the constitutional conflict that
it imagines lies around the corner.  For the Court, this escape hatch is the clear state-
ment rule, which it imposes on Congress in order to protect the integrity of the state
as a political community.209
in this Article, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
202 For an important discussion of the role of clear statement rules, and other interpretive
tools, see id. at 611–28.
203 For an extended discussion of the Court’s “clear statement” jurisprudence, see Raygor
v. Regents of University of Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 543–47 (2002).
204 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
205 Id. at 455–56.
206 Id. at 464.
207 Id. at 467–68.
208 Id. at 463–64.
209 Similarly, in the Spending Clause context, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, there is very
little judicial control of congressional impositions of conditional spending on state govern-
ments. Despite calls by many in the academic community for the Court to reign in Congress’s
authority in ways that mirrored its decisions in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Rehnquist Court did not. This does not
mean, however, that the Court completely ignored the federalism revolution of the Rehnquist
era. For example, in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), the Court addressed a chal-
lenge to a federal statute which required the Secretary of Transportation to penalize state gov-
ernments by withholding federal highway funds from those whose drinking age was less than
twenty-one. Id. at 205. The State of South Dakota challenged Congress’s authority to condition
federal highway funds on a state’s decision to have a drinking age lower than twenty-one. Id.
2011] FEDERAL LAW IN STATE COURT 547
2. Presumptions In Favor of State Regulatory Authority
Presumptions that courts establish are often very much like clear statement prin-
ciples.  Like clear statement rules, the presumptions articulate a default position that
is the background norm, against which Congress legislates.210  However, they operate
slightly differently than clear statement rules.  Where clear statement rules declare what
Congress will have to do to disturb some value—explicitly declare its intention—a
presumption does not simply require that Congress express its intentions clearly.  That
is, the presumption affects the judicial determination about the scope of a particular
interpretive conclusion in ways slightly different from a clear statement rule.  That said,
presumptions, no less than clear statement rules, are used to enforce federalism values.
In addition to the articulation of clear statement principles, the Court has, for much
of the twentieth century, maintained a presumption against the preemption of state law
by national law.211  Much like the Court’s clear statement rules, which recognize the
substantive legitimacy of Congress’s exercise of regulatory authority, the presump-
tion against preemption serves as a guide to courts to narrowly interpret statutory state-
ments claiming to preempt state law.  Here, the presumption acts very much like a clear
statement rule in ordinary statutory interpretation in that it obligates Congress to clearly
identify its preemptive preference in the text of the statute before according the statute
express preemptive effect.  However, even here, the presumption goes beyond the clear
statement principle in that it also affects the scope of a statute’s preemptive effect. 
That is, even where a court concludes that a statute expressly preempts state law, the
scope of the statute’s preemptive effect is often narrowly applied under the presumption
against preemption.
The Supreme Court’s current presumption against preemption springs from its post-
New Deal declaration that both recognized the substantive breadth of Congress’s regu-
latory authority, yet cabined its implications for concurrent state regulatory regimes.212 
The State argued that the statute violated constitutional limitations on Congress’s authority
under the Spending Clause. Id. Although the Court began by stating that Congress’s Spending
Clause authority was not unlimited, it rejected the state’s challenge. Id. at 207. Important to
the Court’s analysis, however, was its discussion of the limitations on Congress’s authority to
attach conditions on federal funding. The Court stated, “[I]f Congress desires to condition
the States’ receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so unambiguously . . . enabl[ing] the States
to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’”
Id. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). The
Court concluded that the statute clearly identified the conditions that attached to state receipt
of their full share of federal highway funding. Id.
210 See, e.g., ELHAUGE, supra note 200, at 311 (arguing that in some cases the Court’s
intention is to “elicit[ ] legislative preferences ex ante” by creating a background rule).
211 See Gardbaum, supra note 197, at 772 n.17 (citing S. Candice Hoke, Transcending
Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829
(1991)).
212 Id. at 806–07.
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In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corporation,213 the Court rejected a challenge to Con-
gress’s substantive authority to regulate grain warehouses but also limited the pre-
emptive effect that national legislation would have on state regulatory regimes.214  In
Rice, the Court articulated the framework for modern preemption analysis.215  Again,
one sees the Court’s attempt to mediate state and national regulatory interaction with-
out demarcating absolute boundaries between their exercise of authority as off limits
to the other.216  Nevertheless, the doctrine serves the purpose of enforcing the values
of federalism.
3. Federalism-Based Avoidance Principles
Beyond federalism-inspired clear statement rules and judicial presumptions, the
Court has also deployed avoidance principles on federalism-inspired grounds.  For
example, when the Court addressed the federalism impacts of decision making by
administrative agencies, the Court has deployed avoidance principles to resist attempts
by agencies that it deems as intruding on what might be deemed to be traditional state
authority.  In Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,217 the Court ad-
dressed a Commerce Clause challenge to the Army Corps of Engineers’ Migratory
Bird Rule,218 which had the effect of extending the agency’s regulatory reach to in-
clude intrastate, non-navigable waters.  The Court avoided the issue of Congress’s
213 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
214 Id. at 237.
215 Id. at 231. Preemption is distinguished between two broad categories—express preemp-
tion and implied preemption. Implied preemption is also divided into three types: (1) conflict;
(2) field; and (3) obstacle. See Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO.
L. J. 2085, 2100–07 (2000).
216 Id. at 237.
217 531 U.S. 159 (2001). The presumption against preemption has been criticized as incon-
sistent with the Supremacy Clause. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 292–93
(2000). Nelson’s arguments against the presumption against preemption appear to be based on
an originalist interpretation of the Supremacy Clause. Id. The development of a presumption
against preemption, however, might be understood as a “modern” innovation by the Court in
its effort to preserve concurrent regulatory authority by state governments in the post-New Deal
era of expanded national regulatory activity. For a historical discussion of the development of
the Court’s preemption jurisprudence, see Gardbaum, supra note 197, at 785–807.
218 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986). The Army Corps of Engineers had authority to
issue permits allowing the discharge or dredge or infill material into “navigable waters” pursuant
to the Clean Water Act (CWA). The CWA defined “navigable waters” as “waters of the United
States including the territorial seas.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.1 (2010). Pursuant to its regulations, the
Corps defined “waters of the United States” to mean waters to include intrastate waters, “the
use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce,” 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3) (2010). Pursuant to its “Migratory Bird Rule,” the Corps regulatory authority
included intrastate waters that provide habitat for migratory birds. 51 Fed. Reg., at 41,217.
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constitutional authority by holding that the agency was not the most appropriate site
for decisions having a significant impact on national-state balance of power.219
Each of the above examples demonstrates the ways in which the Court has rec-
ognized that it is exercising authority that transcends the simple invalidation of a
particular activity because it violates a constitutional provision.  Rather the Court has
interpreted the Constitution’s federalism structure as authorizing it to implement cer-
tain procedural norms that are instantiated in the doctrinal pronouncements such as
clear statement rules or presumptions and that have an impact on the nature of national
and state interaction.220  These cases do not represent the judicial construction of en-
claves that provide absolute bulwarks against national power in favor of state govern-
ments, but they do represent the judicial implementation of constitutional values into
behavioral norms that impact the nature of national-state interaction.
B. Criticisms of Extra-Constitutional Judicial Policymaking
There are two primary criticisms of judicially-articulated behavioral norms in
federalism disputes.  The first is a general opposition to judicial policymaking of what-
ever sort.  This critique has two dimensions, one judicially focused and the other con-
stitutionally focused.  The first class of critics asserts that the judiciary’s institutional
competence is best suited for the task of drawing lines that determine what is allowed
or disallowed under the constitutional framework.221  According to these critics the
judicial function is not well suited for the task of adjudicating disputes where an activity
does not explicitly contravene the Constitution.222  The second is based on a conception
of the Constitution as the embodiment of specific bargains, which cannot be expanded
219 Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 173–74. More recently, the Court rejected an attempt
by the Food and Drug Administration to preempt state tort law claims on the basis of a
preemption decision made in the preamble of an agency rule. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.
1187, 1201–02 (2009). There, the Court highlighted the agency’s failure to undertake notice
and comment rulemaking as a significant factor in its decision not to accord the agency’s
interpretation preemptive effect. Id. at 1202–04. For illuminating discussions of the way in
which the Court has used administrative law in the service of federalism, see Brian Galle &
Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies
at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008); Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative
Law as the New Federalism, 57 DUKE L.J. 2023 (2008).
220 See generally, ELHAUGE, supra note 200 (detailing the default rules created by courts
under an interpretation of federalism authority).
221 See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the
Interpretive Process: An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761, 768–85
(1989) (detailing the judicial role under institutionalist constitutional interpretation). But see
Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998) (positing an
aspect of the judicial role less rooted in a case or controversy).
222 See Redish, supra note 221, at 763.
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upon without doing violence to the intentions of those who engaged in the bargain.223 
These are best understood as the “institutionalist” critiques of the relational enforce-
ment of federalism because of their emphasis on the interaction of the Constitution and
the judiciary as distinct institutions.224
The second criticism is best understood as a substantive critique of the proposal
for a judicially-based relational enforcement of federalism constraints.  It argues that
federalism values are not readily enforceable by the judiciary.225  According to this
view, federalism is best enforced through the political process, as has been shown
through the doctrinal instability and confusion that has ensued whenever the Court
has attempted to assert federalism as a constraint on any significant policy agenda.226
223 See, e.g., John Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional
Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2009–11 (2009) (describing the differences between
textual and purpovist interpretations in terms of the bargain made between the Founders). But
see, Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestanding Federalism, 122 HARV.
L. REV. F. 98, 102 (2009), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/Forum_Vol_122
_metzger.pdf (arguing that Manning’s approach fails to consider the Founders’ intentions that
federalism concerns evolve over time).
224 The distinction between institutional and substantive criticisms of relational federalism
enforcement might appear arbitrary. However, I draw the distinction between institutional
versus substantive because the bases of the different critiques lie in the nature of specific
institutions—either the judiciary or the Constitution—as against the criticisms that are based
primarily on the judicial enforcement of federalism. These criticisms, while they might sound
alike in this context, are motivated by different concerns. The substantive criticism might sound
very different about the capacity of the judiciary when not addressing the enforcement of fed-
eralism (or other structural) constraints, while the institutional critique might be expanded
beyond the domain of federalism enforcement to include judicial implementation of the sort
I discuss in areas that include individual rights enforcement.
225 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW & THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980). Although I
disagree with Choper’s conclusion that judges should not enforce federalism, I am sympathetic
to certain arguments that might bolster Choper’s primary conclusions. That is, to the extent that
federalism values might be judicially enforced, the articulation of such values is likely to be at
an abstract level. Though abstraction doesn’t mean that the articulation is useless (or else I am
wasting my time), but it requires that we recognize that the mere fact of federalism enforcement
does not mean some mechanical adherence to “state’s rights” or “national dominance.” That
is, federalism values can certainly guide judicial decision making, but they do not substitute
for the need to weigh these values against other values, some of which might rank higher in
priority in a given context.  For a discussion of the humility that this discussion requires, see
Bandes, supra note 190.
226 For the classic defense of the political process as the most appropriate site for regulation
of state and national interaction, see Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); see also Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
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1. Institutional Criticisms of Relational Federalism Enforcement
a. Judicially-Focused Institutionalism
The judicially-focused institutional critics of relational federalism enforcement
argue that the judicial role ought to be limited to declaring activity unconstitutional.227 
Any further attempt to regulate action of the political branches of government, in-
cluding duties imposed on state courts, violates the separation of powers.  According
to this argument, the Constitution’s explicit constraints, or those that might reasonably
be drawn from such constraints, exhaust the judiciary’s legitimate function in consti-
tutional adjudication.228
Professor Martin Redish has advanced one of the most significant criticisms of the
institutional legitimacy of judicial constitutional implementation of the sort most
analogous to relational federalism enforcement.229  Although Redish wrote to challenge
the role of the federal courts in articulating statutory (and) constitutional common law,
his criticism likely extends to the judicial articulation of behavioral norms like interest
inclusion.  Redish’s argument begins with an assertion that the Constitution inaugu-
rates a representative democracy, whose primary concern is the “political legitimacy”
227 See Fallon, supra note 42, at 1143–44 (arguing federalists would envision states
emerging as sovereign entities which federal courts would only exercise limited powers
against and state courts would be the ultimate guarantors of constitutional rights).
228 The conception of a limited judicial role in testing the means by which Congress acts
might be inferred from the Court’s seminal decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1816). In upholding Congress’s establishment of the Bank of the United States,
the Court stated:
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are
limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the
sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legis-
lature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers
it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body
to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial
to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.
Id. at 421. However, as will be explained below, I read the Court’s qualifications of the
legitimacy of means used toward the furtherance of even constitutional ends as a basis for
articulating a role for the judiciary that transcends the mere invalidation of authority that has
overstepped its constitutionally established bounds.
229 Redish’s criticism of “judicial policymaking” has spanned the entirety of American
constitutional law. See Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits
of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 114–15 (1984); Redish, supra note 221, at 793–94;
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional
Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 613–15.
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of the decisionmaker, rather than the substance of any particular decision.230  This
“normative premise” of the Constitution underwrites Redish’s conclusion that “issues
not controlled by the Constitution . . . are to be resolved on the basis of judicial policy
assessment only to the extent the representative branches have not already made that
policy choice through legislative action.”231
Understood as it relates to the federalism constraints discussed above, Redish’s
institutionalist perspective rejects what he takes to be judicial overreaching to substi-
tute its policy choices with respect to the interaction of states and the national gov-
ernment.232  These decisions have been made either by the constitutional text or by
Congress in enacting specific pieces of legislation.  If the authority under which the
political branches have acted is constitutionally legitimate, then the judicial role
must be circumscribed to its appropriate boundaries.233  This argument recognizes
that the Constitution’s implementation involves branches beyond the judiciary, but
including Congress and the President as well.234
b. Constitutionally-Focused Institutionalism
The constitutionally-focused institutional argument defends the legitimacy of
the Constitution as a political institution, which is the result of the negotiations and
compromises of the Framers.235  This view challenges the legitimacy of judicial action
230 Redish, supra note 221, at 762. Redish readily admits that this is not the case in every
instance. Id. The Constitution and constitutional doctrine clearly places some substantive deci-
sions beyond the reach of democratic majorities of whatever size. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
231 Redish, supra note 221, at 768.
232 Id. at 765.
233 One can see connections between Redish’s rejection of judicial policymaking, generally,
and his search for a site to justify the commandeering of state courts discussed in Part  I, supra.
This further supports the conclusion that scholars who deem it necessary to find some consti-
tutional delegation of authority for the commandeering power would likely oppose the type of
federalism enforcement offered in this Article on broader grounds than that they disagree with
any specific arguments about the foundation of state court duties to federal claims.
234 There has been a burgeoning literature on the Constitution outside the courts. For dis-
cussions of extrajudicial constitutional implementation, see David P. Currie, Prolegomena for
a Sampler: Extrajudicial Interpretation of the Constitution, 1789–1861, in CONGRESS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 18 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005); see also WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
(2010) (addressing administrative implementation of the “super-statutes” and its effects on
constitutional meaning).
235 The notion that the Constitution represents a compromise of different factions is, itself,
not a radical conclusion. The very basis of the Garrisonian rejection of the Constitution as a
legitimate authority came from the belief that it was a compromise with the forces of slavery.
See DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION
16 (2009). But there is a difference between those who understand the Constitution’s negotiated
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that involves anything beyond giving clear effect to the explicit “bargains” of what the
Constitution represents.236  If a challenged activity exceeds the authority of the gov-
ernmental institution, as prescribed in the text, then it is prohibited as inconsistent with
the Constitution.237 Based on this view, the Constitution admits of only one constraint
on governmental authority, and it is the scope of authority delegated to the institution.238 
Underlying this argument is the premise that the Constitution’s regulation of inter-
action between governmental institutions—or between the government and the indi-
vidual—is exhausted by the allocation of power (or the avoidance of an allocation) to
one branch as against another or the individual rights protected by the Constitution.239 
It argues that where an institution possesses the requisite authority, the Constitution
does not require (or presumably allow) superintendence by anything other than the
political process.240  The Constitution’s allocation of substantive authority, this view
maintains, represents the bargain that was made by the founding generation and sub-
sequent generations of Americans in the form of constitutional amendments.241  The
terms of the bargain established in the Constitution’s textual provisions represent the
commitment to the protection and preservation of particular values—e.g. individual
rights, separation of powers, and federalism.242  To the extent that the judiciary seeks
to impose greater protections for constitutionally-enshrined values, it devalues the
Constitution’s bargained-for protections.
status as a descriptive fact and those who take it as a normative starting point, which constrains
constitutional meaning.
236 See Redish, supra note 221, at 771 n.44 (analyzing Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984)).
237 Id. at 768–69.
238 Id. at 764.
239 Id. at 761–68.
240 See supra note 227.
241 See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
399, 431–32 (2010).
242 One of the most insightful critics of the Court’s federalism-inspired policymaking is John
Manning. Although Manning does not directly aim his fire at judicial “policymaking” of the
sort discussed in this Article, I think his challenge—which explicitly criticizes the Court’s
deployment of federalism-inspired clear statement rules—would indict the argument being
made in this Article. Id. at 404–05, 449. Manning understands federalism as a specific structure
that, at bottom, contains specific textual provisions, which are, themselves, the result of signif-
icant contestation and compromise. Id. at 427. He argues that judicial policymaking unmoored
from specific textual provisions undermines the significance of the constitutional compromise
to the extent that it relies on generalizations from the Constitution’s specific provisions. Id.
at 404. Further, Manning contends that the Constitution does not simply enshrine federalism
as its exclusive value. Id. at 434. Alongside federalism is the commitment to establishing an
effective government, capable of solving real problems. Id. at 433. He argues that federalism-
inspired judicial policymaking either implies that federalism values do not have to be weighed
against other competing values (also the result of compromise), or that, worse, the process of
federalism-inspired judicial policymaking hides the conflict by reducing it to sub-constitutional
status by not actually invalidating an institution’s substantive exercise of authority. Id. at 402.
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2. Substantive Criticisms of Relational Federalism Enforcement
The call for a judicial enforcement of relational norms in federalism is also vul-
nerable to attack from those who view the judicial enforcement of federalism as an
ill-conceived task.243  This argument is based primarily on what critics deem to be the
failure of the judiciary’s past attempts to regulate federalism.  It asserts that the Court’s
past practices were based on its creation of unworkable categories that were incapable
of squaring with the felt needs and sustained policy preferences of political majorities
or were inconsistent across categories of case law.244
These criticisms have been leveled by, among others, Professors Eskridge and
Frickey, who have maintained that the Court’s protection of state autonomy interests
in its recent clear statement cases is inconsistent with the Constitution’s declaration that
the political process be left to decide the scope of congressional regulatory authority.245 
They contend that the rhetoric attached to the Court’s declaration of clear statement
requirements harkens back to an age in which the courts were concerned about up-
setting core areas of state interest, which is reminiscent of the now-rejected dualist age
in federalism jurisprudence.246  Professors Eskridge and Frickey have argued that the
Court’s identification of state autonomy as a core federalism value suffers from the
243 See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 201, at 619–21.
244 For a critique of the formalism of the Court’s federalism case law, see ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, ENHANCING GOVERNMENT: FEDERALISM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 57–97
(2008). But see Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998) (affirming the conception of federalism as com-
promise and rejecting the notion that federalism has a single normative meaning).
245 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 201, at 635–36.
246 Eskridge and Frickey were writing at the beginning of what has come to be called the
Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revival,” which appeared to call into question the Court’s de-
cision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In cases
exemplified by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Court’s federalism jurisprudence seemed to turn toward a dualist
framework. This turn might call into question the current cogency of Eskridge and Frickey’s
criticism. However, I think their criticism remains appropriate in the light of the Court's con-
tinued respect for its previous decision in Garcia. The heated debate within the Court during
this period over the appropriate judicial role in protecting the Constitution’s federalism struc-
ture, and the Court’s more recent refusal to expand upon its decisions in Lopez and Morrison.
See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (invalidating the Attorney General’s regulation
of physician-assisted suicide, in part, on grounds that it would undermine state regulation of
physicians); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (upholding the Congressional ban on home-
grown marijuana against a Commerce Clause challenge). For the most recent example of the
continuing debate within the Supreme Court of the expansion of the Court’s Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, see Alderman v. United States, No. 09-1555, 2011 WL 5949 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2011)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from a denial of certiorari and criticizing the Court’s failure
to prevent what he sees as the undermining of its precedents in Lopez and Morrison).
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same indeterminancy as past efforts to enforce federalism by carving out areas of
protection for state authority.247
C. Justifying Judicial Policymaking in the Service of Federalism
The assertion that the above examples of judicial constitutional implementation
usurp other branches of government rests on a legitimate concern that democratic
decisionmaking cannot ignore the democratic legitimacy of the decisionmakers. 
The judicially-focused institutionalist criticism offered by Professor Redish, among
others, assumes that a democratic deficit plagues judicial institutions.248  This deficit
undermines any judicial involvement in spheres beyond those strictly laid down in the
Constitution.  However, this argument seems to be at its weakest when one considers
judicial implementation aimed at protecting or enhancing the functioning of the
political process.
As Professor David Strauss has written regarding the judicial articulation of
prophylactic rules249 in constitutional adjudication involving individual rights, the
judiciary might possess a comparative institutional competency that justifies its decla-
ration of rules aimed at protecting the legitimacy of the political process.250  It is ex-
actly here that there might be a residual judicial role aimed at protecting the integrity
of state and national interaction beyond boundary maintenance.  According to Strauss,
judicial declaration of prophylactic rules serves an important function when it is likely
that actors will violate constitutional norms,251 and the traditional enforcement mech-
anisms have been abandoned—resulting in the under-enforcement of the constitu-
tional value.  One of the major factors that may cause the breakdown in the proper
functioning of the political process and its ability to adequately protect constitutional
247 See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950);
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 201, at 633–40.
248 See Redish, supra note 221, at 774. The theme of the judiciary’s democratic deficit has
been a constant theme in American constitutional law and theory. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS
(1962). For a rejection of the argument that courts are anti-majoritarian institutions, see
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES
IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993).
249 Prophylactic rules in constitutional adjudication are rules that are not dictated by the
Constitution but are fashioned by the courts as implementing substantive constitutional rights
guarantees. Perhaps the most famous of the Court’s prophylactic rules is Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), which imposed an obligation on arresting officers to provide individuals
with a warning against self-incrimination. Id. at 467–79. For defenses of the legitimacy of the
court’s creation of prophylactic rules, see Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975); David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic
Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988).
250 See Strauss, supra note 249, at 208–09.
251 On the incentives for states and the national government “cheat” in their interaction, see
Bednar & Eskridge, supra note 101, at 1470–76.
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federalism is the growth of national political parties and the extent to which they dis-
tort the incentive structures of both state and national political leaders to protect the
interests of their respective levels of government.252
The constitutionally-focused institutionalist challenge to relational federalism en-
forcement asserts that the Constitution’s delegations of substantive authority—along
with its individual rights guarantees—is the exclusive limit on government’s exercise
of power.  This assertion is premised on the Constitution as a negotiated bargain whose
terms were set by the Framers.  For those who seek to protect the Constitution from
what they consider to be a “free-floating” federalism,253 the notion that the Consti-
tution’s text establishes a set of structures and relationships that appear to suggest con-
straints on state and national interactions beyond the explicit grants and prohibitions
of power is of no small moment.254  The specific textual compromises are the sole
basis for enforcing constitutional federalism.
This challenge to relational federalism is perhaps the most fundamental of the
challenges addressed here because it has a conception of the Constitution as a set of
compromises that fully exhaust the text’s concern with a specific issue.  A relational
conception of American federalism and a relational model of federalism enforcement
could not be more opposed to this conception of the Constitution’s function.  Beyond
these arguments, which have been articulated in the previous Part, the proponents of
the negotiated Constitution fail to appreciate the extent to which the specific circum-
stances that gave rise to the original compromise may no longer be present.255  Changed
facts, however, does not obviate the normative concern that motivated the compromise. 
The value remains a constitutional value even where the specific compromise, as en-
shrined in the text, becomes obsolete or incomplete.  Where this is the case, fidelity
to the Constitution, its values, and its framers might require making “compensating
adjustments.”256  As Professor Ernest Young has written, there is a legitimate judicial
role in adjusting for changed circumstances.257  Since the Constitution’s ratification,
252 On the threat that political parties pose to the constitutional commitment to separation
of powers, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311 (2006). See also Franita Tolson, Partisan Gerrymandering as a
Safeguard of Federalism, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 859 (2011), available at http://www.epubs
.utah.edu/index.php/ulr/article/view/432/330.
253 Manning, supra note 29, at n.234.
254 Note, Textualism as Fair Notice, 123 HARV. L. REV. 542, 547 n.21 (2009). As Professor
Gillian Metzger has pointed out, the dismissal of this way of regulating federalism is incon-
sistent with constitutional-interpretive practice going as far back as Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Metzger, supra note 223, at 102, responding to Manning, supra note 29.
255 See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993) (arguing that
changed interpretations can be faithful to constitutional values).
256 See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence,
and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1739 (2005).
257 Id. at 1762.
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constitutional doctrine aimed at protecting federalism values has been changed funda-
mentally.  Indeed the Constitution’s text has changed fundamentally with the inclusion
of the Reconstruction Amendments.258  Each of these changes has called for adjust-
ments in the implementation of the Constitution’s concern for federalism.259  The
notion that judges have no legitimate role to play in these adjustments is antithetical
to American constitutional practice.
Even if we were to conclude that power allocation is a dominant method of en-
forcing the appropriate interactions between the states and the national government,
it is not clear that judicial policymaking aimed at eliciting the preferences of the legis-
lative branch is inconsistent with the post-Garcia framework.  In Garcia the Court
appeared to abdicate a strong judicial presence in the enforcement of federalism struc-
ture in favor of political process determinations about the scope of national regulatory
258 Id. at 1812–13.
259 This Article has proceeded without making mention of an important argument against
the claims offered herein. The challenge that goes “all the way down” regarding the arguments
presented is clearly the argument that federalism is not a constitutional value in the way that I
suppose. This position rejects the notion that federalism is a value of constitutional dimension
such that it ought be weighted in any equation that attempts to work out the problems that face
the American political community. A slightly different version of this argument might suggest
that federalism is so inextricably connected to the subordination of minority groups that it
cannot possibly persist as a value alongside a constitutional commitment to an egalitarian
social and political order. Although addressing these arguments as they deserve is beyond the
confines of this Article, they deserve some response. It cannot be denied that federalism was
central to shielding racist state policies from the scrutiny of constitutional authority in post-
Reconstruction America and during the Civil Rights Movement. However, federalism has
also made it possible for states to critique certain national policies that might mark blacks
for oppression. For example, anti-slavery activists argued for states’ rights against a national
slavery-protecting power after the enactment of the Fugitive Slave Clause. See HAROLD M.
HYMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. CHASE: IN RE TURNER AND TEXAS V.
WHITE 37–54 (1997). In the post-Civil Rights era, state and local governments have contributed
significantly to the diversification of American political leadership. See Merritt, supra note
147, at 8 (citing statistics showing that blacks and women made up a greater percentage of
offices at the state and local level than they did in national legislative bodies). This is cer-
tainly not meant to suggest that state and local governments are not guilty of rights violations
but that the context in which we ought to think about federalism has significantly changed from
the middle of the twentieth century. It might also be argued that federalism is far more com-
plicated in America today, particularly as proponents of the equality rights of gays and lesbians
defend state authority against what is perceived to be national authority opposed to same-sex
marriage. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, From States’ Rights Blues to Blue States’ Rights:
Federalism After the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 800–01 (2006); see also
LISA L. MILLER, THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME
CONTROL (2008) (examining the extent to which poor minority communities lose control over
crime control initiatives once policymaking decisions shift from the local level to state national
levels of government). This suggests that there ought to be greater protection of local gov-
ernments within the framework of federalism. For an insightful defense of this position, see
Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010).
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authority.260  Eskridge and Frickey argue that the Court’s clear-statement requirements
undermine its earlier decision in Garcia.261  However, commentators have suggested
that the Court’s articulation of clear statement principles seemed to be the logical pro-
gression of the Court’s relinquishment of its authority to enforce substantive constraints
on congressional lawmaking authority on federalism grounds.262  To the extent that
Garcia stands for the proposition that the political process is a more accurate site for
federalism decisions to be made, judicial attempts to ensure that political preferences
are aired is not inconsistent with the original determination.  In fact, to the extent that
the Garcia Court envisioned a residual judicial role in policing congressional action
vis à vis state governments, the Court declared that the judicial role would be limited
260 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
261 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 201, at 633–34.
262 See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349,
1352 (2001) (arguing that clear statement rules “help[ ] the political process police itself”).
Experience indicates that the judiciary can play an important role in the enforcement of con-
stitutional guarantees that have been thought to be non-justiciable by articulating procedural
obligations and behavioral norms to parties involved in contestation over such constitutional
guarantees. For example, the Constitutional Court of South Africa recently decided Occupiers
of 51 Olivia Rd. v. City of Johannesburg, 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC), available at http://www
.saflii.org/zacases/ZACC/2008/1.pdf, a case involving the judicial enforcement of the con-
stitution’s guarantee of a right to housing. Id. The Court declared an obligation of the govern-
ment to undertake “meaningful engagement” when making condemnation decisions that affect
the housing status of homeless citizens. Id. at para. 9. The Court declared: “Engagement is
a two-way process in which the City and those about to become homeless would talk to each
other meaningfully in order to achieve certain objectives. There is no closed list of the objec-
tives of engagement.” Id. at para. 14. Further, the Court declared that the engagement between
the city and the squatters would “contribute towards the resolution of disputes and to increased
understanding and sympathetic care if both sides are willing to participate in the process.”
Id. at para. 15. Nowhere in its opinion did the Constitutional Court of South Africa declare that
the City of Johannesburg lacked the authority to condemn property that met the requirements
for condemnation, yet the City’s exercise of its authority was constrained by the imposed obli-
gation of respect for the fact that the squatters would almost certainly become homeless as a
result of the City’s action. The South African Constitution’s articulation of a right to housing
obligates the state to a behavioral norm that demonstrates its sensitivity to the fact that homeless-
ness will result as a consequence of its actions. S. AFR. CONST. §16, 1996. The Constitutional
Court of South Africa encapsulates this behavioral norm in the obligation that the City under-
take meaningful engagement in situations that might lead to homelessness for occupiers of
condemned property. See Occupiers of 51 Olivia Rd., (3) SA 208. For a discussion of the role
of the judiciary in ensuring socio-economic rights from two different perspectives, compare
MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE
RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 227–264 (2008) (arguing for a reduced judi-
cial role as necessary for effective development of constitutionally-enshrined socio-economic
rights), with Brian Ray, Extending the Shadow of the Law: Using Hybrid Mechanisms to
Develop Constitutional Norms in Socioeconomic Rights Cases, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 797
(arguing for the legitimacy of an expanded judicial role built on the procedural model of
engagement obligations).
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to maintaining the integrity of the political process, as it would be looked to as the first
line of defense of states’ interests.263
In short, it might be argued that the Court’s clear statement rules simply demand
the national political process live up to its billing as the most appropriate protector
of state interests by explicitly engaging in politics about state interests.264  The dis-
cussions below will demonstrate a form of judicial policymaking in the service of
regulating national-state judicial interactions.  These doctrines exemplify the kinds
of constitutionally-inspired judicial practices discussed herein.
IV. JUDICIAL FEDERALISM AND THE NATIONAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP
The relationship between the states and the national government is governed as
much by the interactions between state and federal judiciaries as by the interactions
between states and the national legislatures.265 Part I described the nature of the inter-
actions between federal and state judiciaries and the basis of their overlapping juris-
dictional authority, so it need not be rehearsed here.  Suffice it to say that a significant
portion of federal courts law trains its attention on resolving disputes that arise from
the overlapping exercise of judicial authority.
So far this Article has asserted that the national-state relationship ought to be re-
conceptualized as being regulated by more than the allocation of substantive power to
a particular sphere of government—whether that decision is made by the Constitution
or through the political process.266  It has argued that the regulation of the national-
state relationship involves the recognition of behavioral norms that impose a duty to
consider the interest of the other level of government in any exercise of authority.267 
Further, this article has argued that we can see this alternative account of federalism
deployed in the Court’s case law involving state court duties to federal claims.268 
263 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547–57. Eskridge and Frickey have remarked that “judicial aggres-
siveness at the interpretive level correlates with judicial deference at the constitutional level.”
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 201, at 621.
264 This does not suggest that the model of relational federalism that I have offered accepts
the Rehnquist Court’s framing of federalism issues. The Court has repeatedly treated federalism
as though it were solely about the protection of state autonomy interests to the exclusion of
national interests. As I have articulated, the lasting tension of both union and separation is the
irrefutable element of federalism. As such, the conception of relational federalism offered
above places the value of state autonomy—understood as the value of recognizing the inde-
pendence of states as political communities—alongside the value of national supremacy—
understood as union. For a discussion of the conditional nature of state autonomy, see
Copeland, supra note 27.
265 “The jurisdiction of courts in a federal system is an aspect of the distribution of power
between the states and the federal government.” RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ix (5th ed. 2003).
266 See supra Part II.
267 See supra Part II.
268 See supra Part I.B.2.
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Here, I hope to illustrate that a relational account of federalism enforcement is present
in other areas of federal courts law.269  Understanding the relational dimension of the
Court’s decision making in these areas affords the opportunity for refined critique and
intervention in certain areas of federal courts jurisprudence.
This Part contends that both the Court’s abstention jurisprudence and its appellate
review of state courts jurisprudence demonstrate elements of relational federalism.  In
each of these areas, the Court imposes limitations on its jurisdictional authority in favor
of the recognition of the integrity of state judicial systems.  Nevertheless, each body
of case law demonstrates the Court’s engagement with federalism’s inherent tension
between union and separation.  The recognition of the value of state court separateness
is not considered in isolation.  In each area the Court has articulated doctrine that pur-
ports to reduce the threat of a rupture in the relationship between the state courts and
national law.270
A. Negotiating Overlapping Jurisdiction: Abstention Doctrines
1. Statutory Limits on Federal Jurisdiction: The Anti-Injunction Act
One of the earliest congressional attempts to regulate the interaction between
federal and state courts was the Anti-Injunction Act of 1793.271  The Act prohibited
federal courts from enjoining proceedings in state court.272  Although commentators
have stated that the full purpose of the original statute is unclear, they surmise that its
primary purpose was “to prevent unhampered intrusions by the new federal courts into
269 My inclusion of these two areas of federal courts law is not meant to suggest that I agree
substantively with the Court’s particular analysis or the particular conclusions reached but
rather is meant to highlight the relational dimension of the Court’s decision making.
270 To say that the Court’s doctrine evidences a recognition of and an engagement with the
tension of union and separation is not to say that the Court comes to the correct conclusion
with respect to the values to be placed on these two poles. There are critics who argue con-
vincingly that the Court’s abstention doctrine undervalues the legacy of the Reconstruction era
and its commitment to the jurisdictional authority of federal courts to entertain federal claims.
See Aviam Soifer & H. C. Macgill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction,
55 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1977). Nevertheless, the Court’s abstention doctrine is recognizable as
an attempt to balance the sometimes competing claims of the vindication of federal law and the
integrity of state court processes. Though there might be criticism of the formalism that began
to undermine the coherence of the Court’s abstention jurisprudence, this is not, itself, a re-
jection of the Court's analytical framework for addressing these issues. On the extent to which
formalism undermines the integrity of judicial decision making in the context of federalism,
see Bandes, supra note 190.
271 Act of Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333, 334–35 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(2006)).
272 Id.
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the then well-established state court domain and to codify the then prevailing prejudices
against any extension of equity jurisdiction and power.”273  Despite the Act’s language,
the federal courts interpreted several exceptions to the bar against enjoining state judi-
cial proceedings.  The two exceptions that the federal judiciary read into the subse-
quent versions of the Act were the res exception274 and the exception allowing federal
courts to enjoin actions to enforce fraudulently obtained state court judgments.275  The
Anti-Injunction Act underwent other minor changes during the nineteenth century, in-
cluding the 1874 Act, which explicitly limited federal court authority to enjoin state
court proceedings.276
Despite the purpose behind the 1874 revisions of the Act as a bar on federal court
intrusions into state judicial proceedings, the federal courts continued to articulate
exceptions to the Act such that by the twentieth century, commentators declared the
statute dead.277  However, the Court revived the Act in its decision in Toucey v. New
York Life Insurance Co.,278 in which it reversed a district court’s decision to enjoin
273 See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 260 (1980) (quoting Comment, Anti-Suit Injunctions Between State and
Federal Courts, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 480 (1965)). For a rejection of this thesis, see
William T. Mayton, Ersatz Federalism Under the Anti-Injunction Statute, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 330, 332 (1978) (contending that the second Congress did not intend to enact an anti-
injunction statute in 1793, contrary to the traditional interpretation of the statute, but that it
rather sought to empower Supreme Court justices to issue injunctive relief, but conditioned its
exercise within certain limits—here, that it not be exercised by a single justice). Whatever the
correctness of Professor Mayton’s arguments with respect to the 1793 iteration of the pro-
hibition on enjoining state court proceedings, it is clear that by 1948 a central purpose of the
Anti-Injunction Act was the protection of state court systems from undue interference by the
federal judiciary. See Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism: A Proposal for Reform
of the Anti-Injunction Act, 1990 BYU L. REV. 289, 289–90 (maintaining that the 1948 Anti-
Injunction Act attempts to incorporate both the value of “the autonomy of the state courts” and
the protection of “superior federal interests”).
274 See, e.g., Hagan v. Lucas, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 400, 403 (1836) (setting forth the basis of the
res exception to the prohibition on enjoining state court proceedings on the ground that once a
court takes possession of the res, it should be allowed to litigate the issues without interference).
275 See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 136 (1941) (citing Simon v. S. Ry.
Co., 236 U.S. 115 (1915), and Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891), among others, as
examples of the judicial creation of the exception to the Anti-Injunction Act to enjoin litigants
from enforcing fraudulently obtained judgments).
276 The 1874 statute read: “The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the
United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction
may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.” Rev. Stat. of 1874, ch.
12, § 720, 18 Stat. 134 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006)); see Mayton, supra note
273, at 347. Mayton rightly highlights the irony of the establishment of and bar directed at the
federal courts at the same time that federal courts were being endowed with significant additional
authority under Reconstruction era statutes and other expansions of federal court jurisdiction. Id.
277 Mayton, supra note 273, at 349.
278 314 U.S. 118.
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a state court proceeding under the relitigation exception to the Act.279  The Court held
that there was no relitigation exception and that the Act was an absolute bar to federal
court enjoining of state court proceedings.280  The Court rejected the various exceptions
that the judiciary had articulated throughout the Act’s life.  The 1948 version of the Act
was enacted as a response to the Court’s decision in Toucey in an effort to restore the
law of anti-suit injunctions to its previous status.281  The 1948 Act, which is the current
version, codified various exceptions to the prohibition on the issuance of anti-suit
injunctions by federal courts against state courts.282  The Act included three exceptions:
(1) express congressional authorization; (2) in aid of the exercise of federal court juris-
diction; and (3) where necessary to protect or effectuate the federal court judgments.283
2. Abstention Doctrines: Mediation of Cooperative Judicial Authority
The Supreme Court has imposed constraints on the federal courts’ exercise of
legitimate jurisdictional authority even beyond express congressional limits of the
Anti-Injunction Act.  The federal courts have long subjected the use of its equitable
powers to rigorous scrutiny, particularly when its use threatened to invade territory
deemed significant to the states’ exercise of authority.284  Beyond the Court’s rigorous
policing of its equitable authority, the Supreme Court has further elaborated doctrines
of abstention that counsel federal judicial restraint under the broad principle of comity
toward state judicial systems.285  The Court’s various abstention doctrines have been
variously justified by a desire to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions,286 to re-
frain from interfering with ongoing state criminal prosecutions,287 to avoid disruption
279 Id. The relitigation exception belongs to the class of exceptions that serve to effectuate
federal court judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
280 Toucey, 314 U.S. at 139.
281 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 968.
282 See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2006).
283 Id.
284 See, e.g., Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161–62 (1908) (accepting the proposition that
federal courts are without authority to enjoin a state criminal proceeding but also recognizing
that exceptions to this presumption where the state forum did not provide an adequate oppor-
tunity to challenge the constitutionality of the state criminal proceeding). For a discussion of
the relational dimension of Ex parte Young, see Copeland, supra note 27, at 850–55.
285 The abstention doctrine’s reliance on principles of comity reflects judicial sensitivity to
the interaction between the state and federal courts and is a significant example of the Court’s
attention to relationship in mediating judicial federalism. For a discussion of the role of comity
in federal courts jurisprudence, see Michael Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal
Courts, 60 N.C. L. REV. 59 (1981) (criticizing the inconsistency of the Court’s application of
the comity principle, and the inconsistency of the values for which comity stands in the Court’s
abstention case law).
286 See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
287 See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40–41 (1971).
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of substantial state policy,288 and to prevent duplicative litigation in federal and state
courts.289  In each of these justifications, although present with varying degrees of
potency, is the desire by federal courts to avoid impugning the ability or willingness
of state courts to vindicate federal constitutional or statutory rights.290  In short, the
federal courts’ abstention jurisprudence is justified by solicitousness toward the role
of state judicial systems within the federal system of government.
As has been stated, a relational model of federalism enforcement is premised upon
the Constitution’s inauguration of a relationship between the states and the national
government that is capable of generating norms that obligate each sphere to act in
consideration of the other.  The Court’s abstention case law aims to constrain the exer-
cise of federal court jurisdictional authority in favor of the exercise of state judicial
authority in an effort to protect various state interests.
3. Abstention Doctrine as Relational Federalism
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co. marks the Court’s initial attempt
to articulate a separate abstention doctrine with specific federalism concerns at its
center.291  The Court held that the district court’s injunction against the Texas Railroad
Commission should not have been issued.292  The dispute arose because the Railroad
Commission had ordered that all sleeper cars operated in the state were required to be
supervised by a Pullman conductor.293  At the time trains with one sleeper were not
supervised by a Pullman conductor, but rather were supervised by a Pullman porter.294 
At that time, only whites could serve as Pullman conductors, while blacks could only
serve as Pullman porters.295  The Commission’s order was challenged by the Pullman
Company and by black Pullman porters, who argued that it violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.296
The Court began by analyzing whether it was appropriate for the district court to
have enjoined the Commission’s order.297  Although the Court noted that the claims
288 See, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959); Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317–18 (1943).
289 See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–18
(1976).
290 See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
291 Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501.
292 Id.
293 Id. at 497–98.
294 Id. at 497.
295 Id. For a discussion of the role of Pullman porters in the history of black protest and the
rise of the black middle-class, see BETH TOMPKINS BATES, PULLMAN PORTERS AND THE RISE
OF PROTEST POLITICS IN BLACK AMERICA, 1925–1945 (2001); LARRY TYE, RISING FROM THE
RAILS: PULLMAN PORTERS AND THE MAKING OF THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS (2004).
296 Pullman, 312 U.S. at 498.
297 Id.
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made by petitioners raised serious constitutional issues, it pointed to the fact that
there was also a challenge to the Commission’s authority to issue its order under Texas
law.298  If the Commission was without authority under Texas law to issue the chal-
lenged order, then the federal constitutional challenges to the order would be mooted
by a declaration that the Commission’s regulation was invalid on that ground.299  The
Court concluded that the law in Texas regarding the validity of the Commission’s
order was unclear.300  Maintaining that the federal courts were “outsiders without
special competence in Texas law,” the Court asserted that it had “little confidence” in
its ability to ascertain Texas law in this area.301  The Court continued stating that the
judicial exertion of its equitable authority requires the Court to employ its “sound
discretion” for the consequences that attach to its issuance of injunctive remedies.302 
The most obvious consequence that the Court identified is the friction that might ensue
between the federal and state courts, which have primary authority in the interpretation
of state law. Federal court recognition of the “rightful independence of the state govern-
ments” constrains the federal courts, despite their possession of jurisdictional authority
over disputes like those at issue in Pullman.303  The Court identified its abstention con-
straints as being based in “considerations of policy,” which are aimed at “furthering
298 Id. at 498–99.
299 Id. at 499. The Court’s conclusion that Texas state law might eliminate the need for
judicial confrontation with the constitutional issues is not unique to the abstention doctrine,
as the canon of constitutional avoidance counsels federal courts to refrain from making un-
necessary constitutional decisions. See Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State
Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1409, 1419–20 (1999) (discussing
Pullman as an example of the Court’s avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions).
300 Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499.
301 Id. The Court’s “modesty” is somewhat curious, given the fact that originally the juris-
diction of the lower federal courts extended only to cases arising under diversity jurisdiction,
which involves the federal courts in interpreting state law. Even under the regime of Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which upheld the judicial creation of a federal common law
in cases arising under an Article III grant of diversity jurisdiction, the federal courts deferred
to state statutory law, which required interpretation. Id. at 16. The Pullman Court’s statement
that the “last word” on the “statutory authority of the [Texas] Railroad Commission” should
reside in Texas, rather than the federal courts, Pullman, 312 U.S. at 499–500, belies the fact that
under its diversity jurisdiction it passes on the meaning of state statutes regularly. However,
the Court’s concern about its competence regarding unclear or complex issues of state law is
a basis of the statutory grant of discretion regarding its supplemental jurisdictional authority.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (2006) (allowing a federal court discretion to decline supple-
mental jurisdictional authority over claims that raise novel or complex issues of state law).
See Schapiro, supra note 28, at 1421–22. The Court’s reasoning also appears to suggest that
federal and state courts are strangers, which is clearly inconsistent with the conception of state
and federal court relationship in other lines federal courts law. However, the Court’s recog-
nition of the special province of state law in state court suggests the Court’s recognition of
state court’s special role in articulating state law apart from federal judicial oversight.
302 Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500 (quoting Beal v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Corp., 312 U.S. 45, 50 (1941)).
303 Id. at 501 (citations omitted).
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the harmonious relation between state and federal authority.”304  The Court’s emphasis
on the state legal norms available to resolve the dispute without reference to federal
constitutional norms underwrites its  recognition of the states as independent political
communities, whose courts are worthy of respect.305  This recognition is not very dif-
ferent from an earlier recognition of state courts as institutions of a distinct sovereign
in the case law addressing federal claims in state court.306
Pullman’s relational dimension is even more appreciable when we see the Court’s
comparison of its decision to forego the exercise of its authority in the light of the fed-
eralism relationship against the “rigorous congressional restriction of [the judiciary’s
equitable] powers.”307  The Court’s description seems to highlight the distinction be-
tween the congressional restriction of substantive judicial authority, which sounds
as a direct allocation of substantive authority, and the abstention doctrine that it has
developed.308  Whether the Court is correct to think that abstention is a responsible
alternative to congressional policing of judicial authority, there is no doubt that the
Court thinks of abstention as something other than policing the allocation of the
substantive authority of the federal courts.
Although the period between the Court’s decision in Pullman in 1946 and its
decision in Younger v. Harris309 in 1971 saw the Court articulate additional abstention
doctrines,310 Younger is commonly perceived to be the most important abstention de-
cision of the post-Pullman era because it pits the presumption of the availability of a
federal forum to adjudicate federal claims against a state’s right to enforce its law.311 
In Younger, the Court held that the lower federal courts were obliged to abstain from
enjoining a state criminal proceeding, even where federal constitutional rights were
implicated.312  Younger involved an action brought by a criminal defendant—John
Harris—who was being prosecuted under California’s Criminal Syndicalism Act for
having handed out leaflets that were alleged to have advocated communism.313  Harris
subsequently filed a petition for injunctive relief in the United States District Court,
which was granted based on a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the state
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id. (referencing Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 484 (1940)).
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
310 See, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959); Burford v. Sun
Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317–18 (1943).
311 See, e.g., George D. Brown, Dealing with Younger Abstention as a Part of Federal
Courts Reform—The Role of the Vanishing Proposal, 1991 BYU L. REV. 987, 989 & n.14
(citing Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum: Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation
of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 336 (1989)).
312 Younger, 401 U.S. at 40–41.
313 See id. at 38–40.
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statute.314  In reversing the district court’s issuance of an injunction against the state
court criminal proceeding, the Court explicitly declared that its decision was not dic-
tated by statutory command, but rather by “longstanding public policy against federal
court interference with state court proceedings.”315  The underpinnings of the Court’s
public policy rationale included limitations on the authority of equity courts to inter-
fere with ongoing criminal proceedings, the preservation of the role of the jury and the
avoidance of “duplication of legal proceedings and legal sanctions.”316
In addition to the above, the Court emphasized that these reasons were “reinforced
by an even more vital consideration” that supported its reversal of the district court’s
enjoining of the California criminal proceeding.317  The Court declared that a “proper
respect for state functions” demanded that the federal courts exercise restraint in the
exercise of its jurisdictional authority in the face of demands that it enjoin ongoing
state criminal proceedings.318  The Court’s justification for abstaining in the face of
alleged constitutional violations lay in its recognition of the dictates that attached
to the relationship between the national government and the states under the federal
system of government.319  The Court declared that the relationship inaugurated by
“Our Federalism” required “a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made
up of a Union of separate state governments.”320
The Court’s depiction of federalism as involving an ongoing tension between
separation and centralization resists either the separation of the states from the dictates
of the constitution, or the domination of the states by the national government.  The
Court stresses the obligation to restrain the impulse for a resolution in either direction,
describing “Our Federalism” as meaning neither “blind deference to States’ Rights”
nor “centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government
and its courts.”321  The Court described the posture that the federal judiciary ought to
have with respect to decisions to interfere with ongoing state processes as requiring
“sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments.”322 
The recognition of the perpetual tension demands a dual sensitivity to the interests
of states and the national government, even as the Court appears to guard against the
notion that it is abdicating its role as a protector of federal rights.323  The Court’s com-
mitment to a dual sensitivity does not appear to come with an abdication of its rightful
authority, but rather a declaration that even though committed to the protection of
314 Id. at 39.
315 Id. at 43.
316 Id. at 44.
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
322 Id (emphasis added).
323 Id. at 44–45.
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federal rights, such commitment “always endeavors to do so in ways that will not
unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.”324
At bottom, the relational dimension of the Court’s decision in Younger is based
not on its conclusion, which is not without rightful criticism, but rather on its rejection
of any resolution that would have created a federal court monopoly over federal con-
stitutional claims.  The Court’s conclusion rests on its determination that there could
not be an automatic ouster of a state’s authority to enforce its own law in its own
courts by removing the entire action to federal court.325  A refusal of a state’s interest
to enforce its law in its tribunals threatens to undermine the authority to make law in
its capacity as a political community.  Once the question of wholesale removal of all
state enforcement actions involving federal claims is taken off the table, the range of
responses narrows to the separation of the state and federal claims, resulting in a
declaratory or injunctive ruling to halt state proceedings if the petitioner prevails on
her federal claim, or the allowance of state courts to adjudicate the entire action, with
federal review.326  The Court’s decision in Younger, following its equity jurisprudence,
is to accept the latter choice of allowing state courts to hear enforcement actions and
federal claims challenging these actions.327  To be sure this is an act that symbolizes
324 Id. at 44 (emphasis added). Although I take the Court’s statement to suggest a judicial
oversight of the means of protection and vindication of federal rights, one might state that the
Court’s reference to the “legitimate activities of the States,” id., suggests a certain line drawing
that might be more consistent with an allocational conception of federalism. To the extent that
“legitimate activities of States” can be interpreted to look like a “traditional state function,”
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit. Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 536 (1985), or the like, Younger’s
statements, which seem to sound in relational terms, are also pregnant with allocational ref-
erences. As stated above, this fact does not undermine the description of federal case law in
relational terms, if we are clear that case law need not sound exclusively in either allocational
or relational terms, but that these represent separate chords that are simultaneously present
in a particular case, even if emphasized at different times.
325 See Bator, supra note 124, at 610 (describing three responses to challenge of federal
claims raised in state enforcement actions: (1) removal; (2) collateral review; and (3) separation
of federal and state claims).
326 Id.
327 This decision is consistent with what Martin Redish believes is the strongest basis for
the Court’s result in Younger—respect for state judicial process. REDISH, supra note 273, at
302. Even though Redish believes that this value does not justify the expansions of the
Younger doctrine in subsequent decisions, id. at 303, it is clear that the value of state judicial
proceedings rests in part on the role that state courts play in the vindication of federal rights
guarantees. The enduring status of state courts as instruments of the vindication of federal
law, even after the Reconstruction revolution, serves as the basis for the aspiration that state
judiciaries are presumed capable of vindicating federal rights guarantees. The presumption, or
the strength of such a presumption, is not commanded by the fact of the relationship. The pre-
sumption could work in the opposite direction, or work in the opposite direction with regard
to particular state courts. The essential point of this illustration is that by establishing a rebuttable
presumption, in whatever direction, the Court acts in a way that is respectful of the existence
of a relationship that either allows state courts to “earn” or “retain” their status as institutions
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trust in the state judiciary’s capacity and willingness to invalidate state actions that
violate federal law, but this is no different than the trust that the Supremacy Clause
appears to place in state court judges.328
Moreover, the Court’s abstention doctrine, at least as articulated in Younger,
grants a presumption in favor of state enforcement of its criminal statutes without
federal court interference that is rebutted by a showing that the defendant cannot effec-
tively challenge the validity of her prosecution.329  Younger’s rebuttable presumption
recognizes the fact that the federalism relationship is more than a blank check to state
government; it also requires an effective means of ensuring the supremacy of federal
law.  As articulated in Younger, the abstention doctrine constrains federal judicial
authority in the service of a relationship that involves the judicial vindication of fed-
eral rights from which state courts cannot be banished.330
B. The Adequate State Ground: Mediating Appellate Jurisdiction
Federal courts law does not interpret either Article III or the federal question
statute to require that all federal questions be brought in federal court.  For example,
the well-pleaded complaint rule prohibits federal defenses to serve as the foundation
of the district courts’ original federal question subject-matter jurisdiction.331  Simulta-
neously, federal courts law requires state courts to entertain disputes involving federal
questions without discrimination.332  Further, as discussed above, the abstention doc-
trine has further protected state court litigation involving even federal constitutional
challenges to state law.333  The legitimacy of these decisions to allow (or mandate) state
court decision on federal law questions is premised upon the ultimate reviewability
of state decisions of federal law by the Supreme Court.334  That said, the Supreme
capable of vindicating federal rights guarantees. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 49–54. The doctrine
resists a final resolution to the problem of state court hostility to federal rights guarantees by
not articulating a doctrine that monopolizes judicial enforcement of federal rights.
328 Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA.
L. REV. 719 (2010) (questioning the trust that abstention doctrine places in state court judi-
ciaries in the light of the electoral vulnerability of a majority of state court judges).
329 Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of State-Court State-
Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80, 97 n.68 (2002).
330 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52 (1971).
331 Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
332 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 392 (1947). More will be said about the basis of the Court’s
decision below.
333 See discussion supra Part IV.A.3.
334 The structure of Article III clearly contemplates Supreme Court review of state decisions
of federal law. The bargain reached during the Constitutional Convention regarding the creation
of lower federal courts supports the assertion that Supreme Court review of state decisions of
federal questions is constitutionally required. See Collins, supra note 19, at 40. To the extent
that the Madisonian Compromise left it to Congress’s discretion to establish lower federal
courts, and the limits on the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, failure to create such courts
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Court’s exercise of its appellate jurisdiction affects the relationship between the state
and federal courts.335  The authority of the Supreme Court to review such state court
decisions is without question.336  The scope of the Supreme Court’s appellate juris-
diction over state courts fundamentally affects the status of state courts as the arbiters
of legal meaning.
The constitutional basis of the Supreme Court’s authority to review state court
judicial decisions of federal law is found in Article III’s grant of the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction over this set of decisions.337  In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, the Court re-
jected the Virginia Supreme Court’s challenge to its authority to review its decisions
by referencing Article III’s affirmative grant of power to entertain appeals on all issues
not included in the Court’s original jurisdiction.338  The Court further reasoned that the
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause supported its assertion of appellate jurisdiction over
state decisions in light of the Constitution’s clear concern for both the uniformity of
federal law, and the integrity of federal law against potential state court bias.339
Although Hunter’s Lessee is correctly cited as having definitively established the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions of federal law, the interaction
of the federal and state courts is not exhausted by the declaration that the Supreme
Court possesses the authority to review state court decisions of federal law.  Beyond
this initial decision of judicial authority, the Supreme Court has announced important
(and not uncontroversial) doctrines to regulate the interaction of the Supreme Court’s
appellate review.340
This Part examines the Court’s regulation of its exercise of appellate jurisdiction
over state court decisions by the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine. 
The independent and adequate state grounds doctrine narrows the scope of the Court’s
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions to exclude or review of
state decisions of federal law where there is an independent and adequate state ground
for the state court’s decision.  The doctrine, a court-designed mechanism for regulat-
ing its appellate jurisdiction, also exemplifies the relational conception of federalism
articulated in this Article.341
would have left state courts as the final arbiters of federal law, a prospect inconsistent with the
dictates of the uniformity, if not supremacy, of federal law. Id.
335 See Martin H. Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court “Federal” Decisions: A
Study in Interactive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REV. 861, 899 (1985).
336 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 340 (1816); see also Thomas E.
Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal Cases:
Federalism Along a Möbius Strip, 19 GA. L. REV. 799, 801 (1985).
337 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
338 Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 337.
339 Id. at 340, 347–48.
340 See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 502–05 (1975) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (discussing court-created exceptions to the final judgment rule).
341 By “court-designed” I mean to include it within the larger class of judicial policymaking
discussed earlier in this essay. The conclusion that the independent and adequate state grounds
doctrine is a form of common lawmaking is detailed in Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The
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The Judiciary Act of 1789 regulated the scope of the Supreme Court’s appellate
review over state court decisions of federal law.342  The Act limited the Supreme
Court’s review of state court decisions of federal law to only those decisions that
denied assertions of federal rights and included language that suggested that Supreme
Court review of state court decisions was limited to federal law grounds.343  How-
ever in 1867, Congress amended the Judiciary Act to remove the proviso to section 25
from the Act.344  This removal appeared to imply congressional approval of expanded
Supreme Court review of state court decisions involving federal claims, whether
decided on state and federal law grounds.345
The Court’s decision in Murdock v. City of Memphis346 required the Court to
address the consequences of the amendments to the Judiciary Act for its appellate
jurisdiction.  The dispute involved a suit for recovery of property that had been trans-
ferred by Murdock’s ancestors to the City of Memphis for the purpose of the construc-
tion of a naval depot.347  Subsequently, the City conveyed the land to the United States
government for $20,000.348  Arguing that the land had been conveyed by his ancestors
with the condition that it ultimately be used as a naval depot, Murdock brought suit
in Tennessee state court arguing that both state and federal law required the City to
return the property to him.349
Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 963–73 (1986); Richard A. Matasar
& Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandon-
ment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291
(1986); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128,
1137–45 (1986); Kermit Roosevelt, III, Light from Dead Stars: The Procedural Adequate
and Independent State Ground Reconsidered, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1888 (2003). It is my con-
clusion that the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine is not constitutionally man-
dated. This is based on the argument that justifications that the Court makes for its appellate
authority over state court decisions of federal law—supremacy and uniformity of federal law—
are inconsistent with a doctrine that would require the Court to accept disuniformity in federal
law. That said, the doctrine does not violate the holding in Hunter’s Lessee because the Court
maintains its status as the authoritative interpreter of federal law and accepts non-uniformity
only where it does not matter to the outcome of any particular litigation.
342 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85–87 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (2006)).
343 Section 25 of the Judiciary Act declared:
But no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal
in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the
record, and immediately respects the before mentioned questions of
validity or construction of the said constitution, treaties, statutes, com-
missions, or authorities in dispute.
Id. at 86–87.
344 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § I1 14 Stat. 385.
345 See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 341, at 1315–17.
346 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
347 Id. at 596.
348 Id. at 597.
349 Id.
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Murdock argued that state property law obligated the return of the property to
him.350  Further, Murdock argued that federal law obligated the City to return the prop-
erty to him because the property had been conveyed to the City, and by extension to
the national government, with the aforementioned conditions.351  The congressional
conveyance of the property by statute to the City, therefore, necessarily conveyed the
property to the City with the same conditions that accompanied the original transfer.352 
The state court rejected each of Murdock’s arguments.  On the state property law claim,
the state held that the City held title to the property free of any conditions that it be
transferred to a trust for which Murdock would be an heir because the statute of limi-
tations prevented Murdock from challenging the terms of the original conveyance.353 
On the federal law claim, it held that the act of Congress transferred the land for the
City’s exclusive use, and not in trust for the original conveyors.354  Murdock appealed
to the Supreme Court seeking review of both the state law and federal law issues.355 
Murdock argued Congress’s 1867 amendments to the Judiciary Act of 1789 autho-
rized the Supreme Court to “decide all the questions presented by the record which are
necessary to a final judgment or decree, when it has once got jurisdiction of a case
by reason of any Federal question[,]”356 including questions of state law.
The Court rejected Murdock’s argument.  The Court held that the 1867 Amend-
ments did not authorize its review of state court decisions of state law.357  The Court
explained that its review of the record upon appeal from a state court would include
review of the state law ground only insofar as such review would allow the Court
to determine
whether the decision of the Federal question alone is sufficient
to dispose of the case, or to require its reversal; or on the other
hand, whether there exist other matters in the record actually de-
cided by the State court which are sufficient to maintain the judg-
ment of [the state] court, notwithstanding the error in deciding
the Federal question.358
The Court concluded that beyond this review of state law questions, it could not go. 
On this basis, the Court concluded that its appellate jurisdiction did not extend to cases
in which the state court’s judgment was not affected by the correctness of the decision
350 Id. at 599.
351 Id.
352 Id. at 598.
353 Id. at 598–99.
354 Id. at 599.
355 Id. at 598, 616.
356 Id. at 607.
357 See id. at 633.
358 Id. at 635.
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of the federal question.359  That is, where the decision on the federal question was not
necessary for the final judgment, the Court did not have appellate jurisdiction.
The Murdock Court approached this decision as though it were one of statutory
interpretation—determining the effect of the 1867 amendment.360  The Court con-
cluded that it is “impossible to believe” that Congress intended to require it to expand
its appellate jurisdiction over state courts to the extent that Murdock’s argument would
allow.361  Such a change would mark a significant transformation in the scope of the
Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  At this point, the Court reached beyond the Judiciary
Act to justify the constraints on its exercise of appellate authority, saying:
And though it may be argued with some plausibility that the rea-
son of [limits on the scope of its appellate review] is to be found
in the restrictive clause of the act of 1789, . . . an examination of
the cases will show that it rested quite as much on the conviction
of this court that without the clause and on general principles the
jurisdiction extended no further.362
It is not clear whether the “general principles” to which the Court refers are principles
of its own articulation or principles within the statutory framework.363
Despite the Court’s posture, which suggests that it attempted to glean Congress’s
intention in removing the restriction on its appellate authority, the Court again resorted
to justifications that appear to underwrite the conclusion that the Court framed policy
between the state courts and itself in the light of its own conception of the relationship
between state courts and the Supreme Court.  The Court recognized the argument that
there may be times when it must exercise authority over the entire action in order to
effectively protect federal rights.364  Yet, the Court responded to this answer by offer-
ing eighty-five years of experience as a satisfactory answer.365  Moreover, the Court
declared a faith in the state judiciary that underwrites its conclusions about the proper
scope of its appellate review.  The Court stated:
It is not to be presumed that the State courts, where the rule is
clearly laid down to them on the Federal question, and its influ-
ence on the case fully seen, will disregard or overlook it, and this
is all that the rights of the party claiming under it require.366
359 See id.
360 The suggestion that the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine is statutorily
mandated has been roundly criticized by scholars. See, e.g., Field, supra note 341, at 920;
Matasar & Bruch, supra note 341, at 1318–19; Meltzer, supra note 341, at 1163.
361 Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 629.
362 Id. at 630.
363 See id.
364 See id.
365 Id. at 632.
366 Id.
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The Court’s reasoning seems less the reasoning of a court acting as the mere agent
of the Congress and more the reasoning of a court offering its own justifications for
the policy outcome that it thinks best for the relationship between the state courts
and itself.367
The focus of this discussion is the federalism interests that underwrite the Court’s
decision.  As scholars have noted, the doctrine allows for the growth and development
of a so-called “separate sphere,” in which state governments are able to articulate norms
and values that are distinct from those expressed in federal law.368  The danger inherent
in the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine, however, is that the Court’s
abdication of jurisdiction over even wrongly decided federal claims by state courts
frees state courts to undermine federal law by substantively incorrect applications,
which go uncorrected.369  Perhaps worse than the prospect of incorrect decisions of fed-
eral law in the legal world is the prospect that state courts would manufacture grounds
to avoid Supreme Court review of a federal claim.370
The articulation of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine would, by
necessity, require a judicial determination of the state ground’s adequacy.  However,
the Court’s early pronouncement of the modern version of the doctrine suggested that
the determination of adequacy would be limited to an inquiry of whether the state
law decision would be affirmed regardless of what the Supreme Court decided with
respect to federal law.
Despite the limitations of the adequacy determination articulated in the Court’s
early cases, the Court developed additional requirements for determining the adequacy
of state law grounds where federal rights were at stake.  In one of its earliest decisions,
Rogers v. Alabama,371 the Court reversed a state court’s dismissal of a convicted
367 The Court has also justified its independent and adequate state ground doctrine as rooted
in the prohibition against advisory opinions, see Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945),
and in the avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions, another prudential justification
that underwrites the Court’s avoidance canons, and the Pullman doctrine. See R.R. Comm’n
v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941); supra note 299 & text accompanying notes 315–16.
368 See Ann Althouse, How to Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1485 (1987).
369 See Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 369 (1893) (dismissing action despite the presence
of a federal claim on the ground that the state court’s decision was based on an independent
and adequate state law decision). This is the primary argument against the doctrine offered
by Professors Matasar and Bruch, supra note 341, at 1294 (“[T]he presence of state grounds,
adequate or not, should never preclude the Supreme Court from reaching federal issues in an
appeal from a state court.”).
370 The Court is clearly on guard for the possibility that states will express hostility to federal
rights claims by manufacturing state law grounds to evade federal court review. See Chapman
v. Goodnow, 123 U.S. 540, 547 (1887) (inspecting the state law ground of decision to deter-
mine whether it was “the real ground of decision, and not used to give color only to a refusal
to allow the bar of the decree”).
371 192 U.S. 226 (1904).
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criminal’s constitutional challenge to the composition of the jury.372  The state court
dismissed the petitioner’s motion because of its “prolixity,” which justified the Court’s
refusal to entertain the petition pursuant to Alabama law.373  The Court, after reviewing
the two-page petition, held that “a motion of that length . . . cannot be withdrawn for
prolixity from the consideration of this court . . . .”374  The Court’s ruling appears to
have been based on the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the state’s finding of
prolixity as a predicate for an adequate state ground.375  The failure of a state court to
offer substantial support of the factual predicate for its state law ground rendered the
state ground inadequate.376  Beyond factual insufficiency, the Court’s adequacy deter-
mination expanded to conclude that state law grounds that themselves violated the
Constitution were inadequate grounds for decision.377
From a relational perspective, these judicial modifications of the state grounds
doctrine served federalism interests by preserving the supremacy of federal law and
the availability of its receiving a hearing in the Supreme Court.  Federal rights might
continue to be threatened by state procedural rules, however, with which the failure to
comply was consistently deemed to be an adequate state law ground.378  Increasingly,
the Court was faced with state court determinations that plaintiff’s federal rights claims
were forfeited for failure to comply with state procedural rules.379  In response to these
cases, the Court developed doctrine to determine whether an allegedly neutral state rule
was being applied in ways that might suggest hostility to plaintiff’s federal claims.380
The Court’s adequacy determination of state procedural rules resulting in the
forfeiture of federal claims expanded to include a determination of whether a state’s
procedural rule was mandatory or discretionary.381  Where the state rule had been
applied in a discretionary fashion, the Court held that a state procedural ground sup-
porting the forfeiture of a federal claim was not an adequate state ground.382  In other
procedural default cases, the Court held that state procedural rules that had not been
applied with the “severity” applied in the context of denying review of a federal claim
were an inadequate ground for the state’s decision.383
372 Id.
373 Id. at 230.
374 Id.
375 Id.
376 See also id. at 229–30; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 319–20 (1958).
377 Staub, 355 U.S. at 319 (holding that the state’s standing requirement was an inadequate
state law ground because it would have obligated petitioner to have applied for a license under
a statute that was facially unconstitutional).
378 See, e.g., Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177, 196 (1960).
379 See, e.g., Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965).
380 See Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 383 (1955).
381 See, e.g., id.
382 Id.
383 See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 297–98 (1964).
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In Henry v. Mississippi,384 the Court addressed the issue of whether a state proce-
dural rule requiring the contemporaneous objection to allegedly illegal evidence was
an adequate state ground for dismissing a convicted criminal defendant’s challenge
to his conviction.385  Here, the Court introduced a new factor for consideration of the
adequacy of a state procedural rule.  The Court declared that to find adequacy in proce-
dural default cases involving federal rights claims, the state must establish that compli-
ance with the rule “serves a legitimate state interest.”386  The state interest determination
is a fact-intensive analysis of the factual setting and the state’s interest in compliance
with the particular procedural rule.387
At the time of these decisions, the scholarly community appeared concerned that
the Court’s decisions were moving in a direction that indicated an eradication of the
state grounds doctrine.388  This was clearly an important concern regardless of whether
this was seen as a good or bad development.  But for the purposes of this discussion,
what is most significant is the way in which the Court’s state grounds doctrine both
its original deployment and the Court’s later cabining of its threats to the vindication
of federal rights demonstrates both the flexibility and attractiveness of judicially-
managed jurisdictional doctrines.  Moreover, doctrinal developments demonstrate
the extent to which state and federal interests remain in the equation throughout.  The
weights ascribed to variables may change, and the presumption of trust in state courts
may diminish (or increase), but the relationship between state courts and federal courts
is not negated.
V. FEDERAL LAW IN STATE COURTS: A RELATIONAL RECONSIDERATION
The interaction between state and federal judicial systems is likely nowhere more
evident than when a state judicial system exercises adjudicatory authority over federal
claims, and vice versa.  The treatment of the law of a “separate” sovereign is one of the
central issues in judicial federalism, and, indeed, all of federalism.389  Though scholars
384 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
385 Id.
386 Id. at 447.
387 Id. at 447–48.
388 See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 991 (1965)
(arguing that Henry “undermine[d] [the state grounds doctrine] by expanding the basis for
attack on the state procedural ground”); Terrance Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the
Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 187, 239
(arguing that Henry posed a danger that the Court would “swing to the other extreme, abolish-
ing the concept of adequacy so far as state procedural grounds are concerned”). As we now
know, none of these extremes came to pass, as the Court has stepped back from these decisions
in recent case law, particularly in the context of habeas challenges. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478 (1986). But see Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (deploying the adequate
state ground cases over a vigorous dissent by Justice Ginsburg, see id. at 137–45 (Ginsberg,
J., dissenting)).
389 See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938).
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and commentators have spent significant amounts of time (and ink) describing the
history, transformation, and continuing intricacies of the phenomenon of federal courts
entertaining state causes of action,390 the reverse phenomenon is not treated with
nearly as much attention.391  This Part attempts to review the history and theory of
state courts’ adjudication of federal claims as a window to both judicial federalism and
the role of judicial policy making in the resolution of disputes arising from state court
adjudication.  This review supports the assertion that, in answering the question of
state court duties to federal law, the Court has relied on more than specific textual pro-
visions.  To be specific, the Court has relied on a reading of enduring connection and
relationship between the state and federal courts as a significant basis in its articulation
of state court duties to federal law.  Moreover, this review will establish that the Court
is engaged in judicial policymaking based upon its articulation of behavioral norms
that derive from the fact of relationship.  This discussion proceeds in three parts. This
Part reviews the history and justification of both the state court authorization and duty
to entertain federal claims, and then examines the jurisprudence of state law preemption
in the face of conflicting federal rules.  Each discussion is aimed at uncovering the
role that the national-state relationship plays in the Court's attempt to respond to each
of these issues.
A. State Court Authority to Adjudicate Federal Claims
State court authority to entertain federal claims has largely been assumed through-
out American history. Arguments in favor of state court authority to entertain federal
causes of action date back to the constitutional framing, particularly the Madisonian
Compromise.392  These debates focused on the question of whether lower federal courts
would be made mandatory in the Constitution.  Madison and others argued in favor
of mandatory lower federal courts.393  This proposal was opposed by John Rutledge.394 
390 See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974);
Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie: And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 383 (1964); Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96 CAL. L. REV. 595 (2008); Martin
Redish & Carter Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate
Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977).
391 Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2006); Joseph R.
Oliveri, Converse-Erie: The Key to Federalism in an Increasingly Administrative State, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1372 (2008). The Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins has
the distinction of speaking for an entire era or way of thinking about law and federal judicial
power. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 209 (2000).
392 Prakash, supra note 35, at 2018.
393 See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 124 (Max Farrand ed.,
1937) [herinafter THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION].
394 2 id. at 428.
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A compromise was reached by the two sides empowering, but not requiring, Congress
to establish lower federal courts.395  From this decision not to impose a duty on Con-
gress to establish lower federal courts, commentators have concluded that the Framers
impliedly concluded that state courts would exercise jurisdiction over federal claims.396
State court obligation to entertain federal claims has  been thought to flow from
the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause.  The Supremacy Clause, which is partly directed
at state court judges, obligates state courts to apply federal law where it might apply
as the law of the land, even invalidating state law that contradicts with such federal
law.397  The provision has been read to make federal law the governing law of the
state, and as such authorizes state law to adjudicate federal disputes.
The assumption of state court jurisdiction over such claims is based largely on the
Founding-era conception of judicial jurisdiction.  Judicial jurisdiction was thought to
be commensurate with the claims available to be brought by those within its adjudica-
tory authority.398  Alexander Hamilton argued that state courts would possess authority
to exercise concurrent jurisdiction over federal claims,
[t]he judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own
local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all subjects
of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction though the
causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part
of the globe.  Those of Japan not less than New-York may furnish
the objects of legal discussion to our courts.399
Yet even as Hamilton justifies state court adjudication of “foreign” claims as
deduced “from the nature of judiciary power,” he also draws the state courts and the
federal courts into a special relationship.400  In addition to the understanding of judicial
power, Hamilton adds that when
we consider the state governments and the national governments
as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems and as parts of
ONE WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive that the state
395 Prakash, supra note 35, at 2018; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 9.
396 See Prakash, supra note 35, at 2018 (arguing that the Madisonian Compromise estab-
lishes the founding-era belief that state courts had authority to entertain federal claims). But see
Collins, supra note 19, at 105 (questioning the significance of the Madisonian Compromise
in determining state authority to entertain federal claims).
397 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
398 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 393, at 430 (Madison’s notes
of Aug. 27, 1787, demonstrating that the delegates “generally supposed that the jurisdiction
given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature”).
399 THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 105, at 555 (Alexander Hamilton); see Bellia,
supra note 52, at 969–76.
400 THE FEDERALIST NO. 82, supra note 105, at 555 (Alexander Hamilton).
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courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising
under the laws of the union, where it is not expressly prohibited.401
Each of the above arguments in favor of state court authority to entertain federal
claims was articulated by the Court’s first, and unequivocal, declaration of the state
judicial authority in Claflin v. Houseman.402  There, the Court maintained that a state
court could exercise jurisdiction over a claim arising from the bankruptcy statute.403 
Against the assertion that a state court was prohibited from adjudicating a claim aris-
ing under a congressional statute, the Court concluded, “[I]f exclusive jurisdiction
be neither express nor implied, the State courts have concurrent jurisdiction whenever,
by their own constitution, they are competent to take it.”404  The Court’s decision
traversed the explanations of the state court’s authority based on Hamilton’s argu-
ment in Federalist No. 82, the Supremacy Clause and the trans-territorial nature of
judicial authority.
Beyond these arguments, federal relationship played an important role in the
Court’s rejection of the challenge to the state courts’ exercise of concurrent jurisdic-
tion over federal claims.  In addition to its explicit inclusion of Hamilton’s discussion
of the kinship of the national and state governments, the Claflin Court expanded upon
this discussion.405  The Court maintained that acceptance of the assertion that state
courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over federal law claims would imply that the two
systems are not connected into “one system of jurisprudence, which constitutes the
law of the land for the State; and the courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to
each other . . . having jurisdiction partly different and partly concurrent.”406  From this
reading of relationship—whose basis is, at least partially, the Supremacy Clause—the
Court concluded that there is unity between the two judicial systems.407  The Court
declared a relationship that did  not result in the eradication of the distinctiveness of
either judicial system.408  This conception of relationship is central to its justification of
401 Id.
402 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
403 Id. at 142–43.
404 Id. at 136.
405 Id. at 137.
406 Id.
407 Patrick Gudridge has described the Court’s reference to the relationship between the
state and federal courts as imbued with the impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction era.
See Patrick O. Gudridge, Pangloss, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 763, 782 n.105 (2007). The Union
victory in the Civil War affirms the faith that the Nation’s union could not be refuted by the
forces of secession. After the Civil War, as at no other time in American history, the enduring
nature of the Union was a fact and not a profession of faith. For a discussion of the history
of the theme of disunion in Antebellum America, see ELIZABETH R. VARON, DISUNION! THE
COMING OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR, 1789–1859 (2008).
408 For an insightful discussion of the benefits of the intersystemic enforcement of rights
in a federal judicial regime, see SCHAPIRO, supra note 28.
2011] FEDERAL LAW IN STATE COURT 579
duties imposed on state courts and the extent to which such duties justify the displace-
ment of state law.
B. From Authority to Duty: Relationship as the Source of Obligation
Does state authority to entertain federal claims evolve into a duty to entertain
federal claims?  If so, what is the basis of such an obligation?  The discussion of state
court obligation to entertain federal law follows along a similar track as the above dis-
cussion of state court authority.  The debates of the Constitutional Convention estab-
lish that there was likely a belief that state courts would be open to federal claims.409 
Again, the debate between James Madison and John Rutledge regarding the creation
of lower federal courts serves as one of the primary originalist arguments in favor of
state court duty.410  Not only did the opposition to the creation of lower federal courts
by Rutledge and others imply state court authority to entertain federal claims, Professor
Saikrishna Prakash argues that it establishes the expectation that state courts would
be open to federal claims.411  Further, the Madisonian Compromise, resulting in the
option to establish lower federal courts, rested on the conclusion that state courts could
be called upon to enforce federal law, and “[m]any . . . wanted state courts to be the
exclusive courts of original jurisdiction.”412
Beyond the Convention debates, there is a basis in the Constitution to conclude
that states have a duty to adjudicate federal claims in Article I’s Inferior Tribunals
Clause.413  As Professor James Pfander has argued, this constitutional provision was
interpreted by many in the Founding era as establishing Congress’s authority to turn
to state courts to constitute lower federal courts.414  This interpretation is buttressed by
the historical practice of the Continental Congress and the Articles of Confederation,
which pressed state courts into service to adjudicate federal claims.415
On whatever ground Congress’s authority to commandeer state courts is based,
it generally proceeds as a debate about the scope and limits on Congress’s power.  As
such, the search to discern reasonable limits on such power is based on identifying
enclaves of sovereignty that are retained by the states, or some explicit constitutional
409 For one of the most authoritative discussions of state court commandeering, see Prakash,
supra note 35, at 2021–22 (arguing that the Framers likely believed that state courts could
be obligated to entertain federal claims). For an incisive critique of Prakash’s interpretation
of Founding-era debates about the commandeering of state courts, see Collins, supra note
19, at 137–44.
410 Prakash, supra note 35, at 2018.
411 Id. (“[W]hen Rutledge, Sherman, et al., opposed the creation of inferior courts, they were
implicitly pledging that state courts would always be open to enforce federal law.”).
412 Id.
413 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
414 Pfander, supra note 53, at 202.
415 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1–2; Prakash, supra note 35,
at 1967–71.
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principle from which a limit might be implied.  Neither the scholarly commentary
seeking to define the constitutional basis for commandeering state courts, nor the
Court’s own articulations of such authority seem to imply recognition of any limits
on commandeering authority on the basis of a corresponding duty of respect for state
court integrity.  Even Professor Michael Collins’s insightful discussion of the founda-
tion of the qualified nature of state court commandeering is based on a determination
of the perceived inability of state courts to entertain the full scope of federal question
jurisdiction.416  None of these suggest that there might be another basis for constraining
or conditioning state court duty.
A review of the Court’s case law, when understood in conjunction with the Court’s
previous deployment of the national-state relationship, suggests that the Court’s con-
tinued conditioning of state court duty is based in something other than solely the
Constitution’s textual provisions.  More specifically, the duty of state courts to enter-
tain federal claims, and the limits on this duty, are at least in part the result of judicial
policymaking based on the fact of relationship and norms that arise from it.  As dis-
cussed above, state authority to entertain federal law is based on the court’s jurisdic-
tional availability to entertain disputes arising under law of another jurisdiction.417  The
Court’s case law addressing state court duties to federal law appear to condition such
availability on state court jurisdiction.  A significant element of the Court’s jurispru-
dence is that state court jurisdictional availability is determined by the state itself.  Fed-
eral law does not provide the basis for determining state court jurisdictional ability.418 
This is logically consistent with the Court’s recognition, cited above, of the state court’s
distinctiveness from the federal judicial system.  Though there is clearly connection
between the two systems in many respects that transforms them into “one” system,
this connection does not eliminate the separateness of the two systems.
The Court’s decision in Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Co.419 might be read as imposing the duty of state court availability with few discern-
able limits, however even here, the state court’s distinctiveness from the federal courts
is appreciated.  There, the Court addressed the issue of whether a state court could re-
fuse jurisdiction over a Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) claim.420  The Court
rejected the state court’s conclusion that it could refuse to exercise jurisdiction over
the federal claim on two grounds.  The first was that the state’s jurisdiction was com-
petent to address the claim brought under the FELA.421  The Court concluded that the
FELA did not represent an attempt by “Congress to enlarge or regulate the jurisdiction
of state courts . . . but only a question of the duty of such a court, when its ordinary
416 Collins, supra note 19, at 49–50.
417 See Douglas v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 385–86 (1929)
(upholding a state court’s denial of jurisdiction over federal claim).
418 See id. at 386 (emphasis added).
419 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
420 Id.
421 Id. at 57–58.
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jurisdiction as prescribed by local laws is appropriate to the occasion . . . .”422  The
recognition that state law is the determining factor of state court jurisdictional avail-
ability rests on a recognition of the separate identity of state governments, as the Court
declares in quoting the “distinct sovereignties” language from Claflin.423  This suggests
that state duty to federal claim is not without limit and that the limit cannot be set from
an external source.
Despite the implication that there are limits on state court jurisdictional availability,
the Court’s jurisprudence clearly stands for the proposition that a state is not free to
configure jurisdictional authority in any way it sees fit.  The Court has concluded that
where a state court exercises general jurisdictional authority, the state’s only justifi-
cation for refusing to entertain federal claims is a substantive disagreement with fed-
eral policy.424  Such a disagreement with federal policy cannot serve as a justification
for refusing jurisdiction over federal actions, because it both undermines Congress’s
authority to legislate for the nation, and rupture the state’s relationship from the
whole.425  In Mondou, the Court declared:
When Congress, in the exertion of the power confided to it by the
Constitution, adopted [the Federal Employers’ Liability Act], it
spoke for all the people and all the States, and thereby established
a policy for all.  That policy is as much the policy of Connecticut
as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should
be respected accordingly in the courts of the State.426
States are understood as having a special connection to the law made by the
national legislature, and their courts are obliged to act consistently with the fact that
national law is state law.  This relationship serves as the basis for generating a behav-
ioral norm imposed on state courts not to discriminate against federal law.427  Such
discrimination treats federal law as though it were “foreign” and imposed from an ille-
gitimate source of authority.428  Such a conclusion must be rejected, even where state
distinctiveness is recognized.
The federalism relationship plays an even larger role in the Court’s seminal de-
cision rejecting a state’s attempt to close its doors to a federal claim in Testa v. Katt.429 
In Testa, the courts of Rhode Island had dismissed a suit brought under the Emergency
422 Id. at 56–57.
423 Id. at 57–58 (quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 92 U.S. 130, 136 (1876)).
424 See, e.g., id. at 55.
425 Id. at 57.
426 Id.
427 See Douglas v. New York, 279 U.S. 377 (1929) (upholding a state court’s denial of
jurisdiction over federal claim).
428 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
429 Id.
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Price Control Act.430  The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the state courts lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the claim because the Act provided for treble damages and, as
such, was a penal statute.431  In an earlier decision the Rhode Island Supreme Court had
held that it could not enforce the penal statutes of foreign governments.432  The Court
rejected the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s holding.  Reasoning from the Supremacy
Clause, the Court concluded that the “States of the Union constitute a nation.”433  But
the Testa Court also rested its decision on the reasoning offered in Claflin.434  Again,
the Court emphasized the connection between the states and the national government—
a connection that undermined any conclusion based on the treatment of the national
government as though it were a “foreign sovereign.”435  The full extent of state court
duty to adjudicate federal claims remains a bit unclear from the Court’s discussion of
the relationship.  It is unclear what if any limits exist regarding the duty state courts
owe to federal claims.  The relationship theme might be read to suggest that there are
no limits on state court duty.  But the Court’s holding seems to be a bit narrower.  It
appears to recognize some limit on state court duty to adjudicate federal claims.  Again,
the state court’s availability (and its limit) is consonant with the scope of a state’s juris-
diction, which the state establishes itself.  The Testa Court concluded that the Rhode
Island courts had exercised jurisdiction over claims analogous to those arising under
the Emergency Price Control Act, including multiple-damage awards.436  As such the
Court held that the state courts could not discriminate against the federal law claim
that is cognizable under its self-imposed jurisdiction.437
C. Federal Preemption of State Law in State Court
As in each of the other areas, the themes of union and independence are explicitly
considered and put forth as justifying the Court’s decisions regarding the preemption
of state procedural rules when state courts adjudicate federal claims.  The evolution
of the Court’s jurisprudence exhibits its attempt to wrestle with the issues of the extent
to which the federal and state courts represent one system or two separate systems. 
To an even greater extent than in the two preceding discussions of state courts and fed-
eral law, the area of federal preemption of state law raises questions of the balancing
of the implications of unity and separation.
Nowhere is the Court’s explicit recognition of the tension of connection and
separation clearer than in its decision in Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Co. v.
430 Id. at 386.
431 Id. at 388.
432 Id. (discussing Robinson v. Norato, 43 A.2d 467 (R.I. 1945)).
433 Id. at 389.
434 Id. at 390–92.
435 Id. at 391.
436 Id. at 394.
437 Id. at 392–94.
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Bombolis.438  There, the Court faced the question of whether a state’s rule allowing
for non-unanimous jury verdicts was preempted by the Seventh Amendment when
the state courts adjudicated federal claims.439  The Court unanimously answered the
question with an emphatic no, explaining that long-settled precedent had concluded
that the Seventh Amendment’s obligations did not fall on state courts.440  Beyond this,
the Court explained why preempting state law would be inconsistent with the sepa-
ration of two judicial systems, as imposing federal procedural obligations on state
courts would suggest that they be “treated as Federal courts.”441  Such a “fluctuating
hybridization,” the Court reasoned, would rob both federal and state courts of “all real,
independent existence.”442  The Court concluded that imposing federal procedural
burdens on state courts would make their status as state or federal courts “depend not
upon the character and source of the authority with which they were endowed by the
government creating them, but upon the mere subject-matter of the controversy which
they were considering.”443  For the Court, a conclusion that state procedural rules must
yield in the face of national procedural rules would be to invalidate their existence as
separate adjudicatory structures.
Although the Court emphasized the separation of the state and federal judicial
systems as one explanation for refusing to preempt state law regarding jury verdicts,
the Court also highlighted the connection between the two systems as the basis for its
refusal to displace state procedures.444  The Court concluded that the argument in favor
of preemption of state procedural rules is inconsistent with the “essential principle” of
concurrent state and federal judicial authority over federal claims.445  On the Court’s
reading, concurrent of adjudicatory authority “cause[s] the governments and courts of
both the Nation and the several States not to be strange or foreign to each other . . . but
to be all courts of a common country . . . .”446  Though the Court recognized connection
between the state and federal courts, it is a connection that accepts the distinctiveness
of the authority undergirding each system.447
438 241 U.S. 211 (1916). For a useful discussion placing the case in a larger historical
context, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958 (1992).
439 Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 216.
440 Id. at 222–23.
441 Id. at 221.
442 Id.
443 Id.
444 Id.
445 Id.
446 Id. at 222.
447 The Bombolis Court appeared to equate all preemption of state procedure with oblit-
eration of the distinction between the state and federal judicial systems. This characterization
of preemption does not provide adequate accommodation of the interests of the federal right
entertained in state court. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 
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Although the Court’s opinion in Bombolis failed to create space in its framework
for the consideration of the interests that might justify preemption of state law in a
particular case, it appears to lay the foundation for its later consideration of equal
treatment of state and federal claims as a factor in the preemption analysis.  As was
discussed above, the Court maintained that the state court’s duty to entertain federal
claims arose from its having been empowered to entertain such actions by state law.448 
As such, there is an implicit obligation upon the state not to discriminate against fed-
eral causes of action.  Yet in the Court’s post-Erie cases it appeared to reject non-
discrimination as a useful analytic distinction in determining when federal law would
preempt state law.
In these cases, the Court seemed to interpret every procedural distinction between
the federal and state courts as substantively impairing the federal right under which
an action was filed.  In Brown v. Western Railway of Alabama,449 the Court held that
federal law preempted both a state procedural rule allocating the decision of fraud to
the judge rather than the jury and a state’s restrictive pleading standard.450  In each of
these cases the Court emphasized federal interest in the uniform application of federal
law, and its conclusion that the procedural rule was “bound up” with the substantive
federal right.451  In these cases the Court failed to provide a useful analytical frame-
work for determining when a procedural rule was so “bound up” with a substantive
right that a procedural deviation would undermine it.  What is clear, however, is that
54 COLUM. L. REV. 489 (1954). As stated above, the relational model of federalism enforce-
ment does not require either party to engage in acts of self denial. This is especially problematic
because the vindication of federal rights is at stake and because the federal relationship is under-
mined when such rights are frustrated by hostile state governments. A failure to respond to this
hostility undermines the values of separation to the detriment of unity. See Meltzer, supra note
341, at 1131–32 (arguing in favor a judicially-created body of law to protect federal rights from
state procedural rules that result in forfeiture on the basis that the federal system requires it).
This argument rested on the adage that federal rights claimants took the state courts as they
found them. But see Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923).
448 Bombolis, 241 U.S. at 221–22.
449 338 U.S. 294 (1949). The Court’s decision in Brown has been criticized by members of
the scholarly community, who argued that the Court’s decision left it free “to impose a second
procedural system upon the states in accordance with its own conceptions of what a reasonable
system ought to provide.” Hill, supra note 388, at 972–73.
450 Brown, 338 U.S. at 298. The dissent agreed that the allocation of fact-finding authority
to the judge was a substantive violation of the federal law under the Seventh Amendment and
was preempted by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 299–303 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
The Court’s framework foreshadowed the analytical framework that it would adopt in one
of the most important post-Erie decisions, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S.
525 (1958), in which the Court held that the Constitution’s Seventh Amendment allocation
of decision-making authority to the jury (rather than to the judge, as was the case in the state
court) was a “countervailing” federal interest that merited sacrificing its strict adherence to
litigant equality.
451 Byrd, 356 U.S. at 535.
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the majority of the Court rejected a singular reliance on the non-discrimination factor
as capable of protecting important federal interests in state court adjudications.452
Lying underneath the Brown Court’s analysis was the relational thread that under-
wrote the Court’s subsequent shift from a non-discrimination principle to what might
be best called a non-frustration principle.  This shift developed a preemption analysis
that provides for the protection of national interests, even where equal treatment of
state and federal claims is not the worry.  In addition to its reference to both the restric-
tive pleading requirement’s substantive impact on a federal right, and worries about
uniformity, the Court also declared that the pleading standard imposed “unnecessary
burdens” on the vindication of a federal right.453  Again, the Court failed to explain
what it meant by “unnecessary,” but the introduction of such language opened the
possibility for a more textured consideration of the competing interests at stake when
the question of displacing state law arises.
The seeds of the Court’s frustration analysis began to bear fruit in its decision in
Felder v. Casey,454 in which the Court reversed the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s dis-
missal of a section 1983 action for failure to comply with the state’s notice-of-claim
statute.455  The Court held that the notice-of-claim statute was preempted with respect
to federal civil rights claims brought in state court.456  The Court’s analysis is not a
model of clarity, and it begins with a discussion of the Supremacy Clause that appears
reminiscent of the language of Brown, however, the Court engaged in a textured
analysis that tried to place the federal right in context against the burden that the state
procedural rule imposed.457  Moreover, the Court identified the state's interest in main-
taining the applicability of its notice-of-claim rule, and weighed it against the interest
to be vindicated by the federal right.458  Perhaps most importantly, the Court highlighted
452 See generally Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53 (1949); Bailey v. Cent. Vt. Ry.,
Inc., 319 U.S. 350 (1943).
453 Brown, 338 U.S. at 298.
454 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
455 Id. The notice-of-claim statute required plaintiffs bringing actions against any state,
governmental subdivision or officer to notify the defendant within 120 days of the alleged
injury, or show that the defendant had actual notice of the claim and was not prejudiced by the
failure to provide written notice. Id. at 131. Further, the statute required the plaintiff to provide
an itemized statement of relief to the defendant, which has the right to grant or refuse the
request within 120 days. Id. The plaintiff was obligated to file suit no later than six months
after being refused relief by defendant. Id.
456 Id. The statute applied to claims brought under federal and state law.
457 Id. at 138–40. The majority highlighted the fact that civil rights plaintiffs “often do not
appreciate the constitutional nature of their injuries, and thus will fail to file a notice of injury
or claim within the requisite time period, which in Wisconsin is a mere four months.” Id. at
152 (internal citation omitted).
458 Id. at 142–43. The Court identified the state interests as intended for the benefit of gov-
ernment defendants. The statute allowed “defendants to investigate early, prepare a stronger
case, and perhaps reach an earlier settlement.” Id. at 142 (internal quotations omitted). Unable
to reach a settlement, the Court noted that the statute “forces claimants to bring suit within
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the fact that the application of the state rule would result in dismissal for the state court
plaintiff, and extinguishment of all possible vindication of his federal claim, while a
similarly situated federal claimant would not suffer the same fate.459  The Felder Court
undertook this context-sensitive analysis in order to determine whether state law ought
to be preempted in a particular instance.460  Although there is no mention of enduring
connection, the framework that the Court constructs is the embodiment of a relational
analysis committed to the inclusion of the interests of the state courts and the federal
rights at issue in preemption disputes.461
Like Felder, Haywood v. Drown462 forced the Court to address the issue of when
state procedural rules must give way to the vindication of federal rights.463  The case
involved a section 1983 prisoner suit brought against state corrections officers for
alleged violations of the prisoner’s civil rights that grew out of prison disciplinary
proceedings.464  The plaintiff filed an action in the New York State Supreme Court
(the trial court of New York).465  The trial court dismissed the suit on the ground that
it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the suit based on a state statute that deprived it of
jurisdiction over state and federal suits seeking money damages against correction
officers for job-related actions.466  The dismissal was appealed through the New York
Court of Appeals (the state’s highest court), where the trial court’s decision was nar-
rowly upheld.467  The Supreme Court reversed the decision in a 5-4 vote.  The majority
held that the New York jurisdictional statute violated the Supremacy Clause, which
obligates state courts to apply federal law against conflicting state law.468
The Court reasoned that the state’s statute resulted from a policy decision to
immunize corrections officers from section 1983 liability.469  The Court declared this
to be in direct conflict with “Congress’ judgment that all persons who violate federal
rights while acting under color of state law [ ] be held liable for damages.”470  The
state’s statute was seen as an attempt by the state to “dissociate [itself] from federal
a relatively short period” in order to “minimiz[e] liability.” Id. These interests are weighed
against the interests of section 1983 claimants. Id.
459 Id. at 151–52. The Court noted that when entertaining claims against the class of defen-
dants protected by the notice-of-claim statute under diversity jurisdiction, federal courts apply
the notice of claim statute because it is outcome-determinative. Id.
460 See generally Meltzer, supra note 341, at 193 (advocating a context-specific analysis in
some instances of conflict between state procedural rules and federal law).
461 See generally Clermont, supra note 391.
462 129 S. Ct. 2108 (2009).
463 Id.
464 Id. at 2112.
465 Id.
466 Id.
467 Id.
468 Id. at 2117–18.
469 Id. at 2115.
470 Id. (emphasis omitted).
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law because of disagreement with its content or a refusal to recognize the superior
authority of its source.”471  As such, the state’s statute was treated as one in direct
conflict with a federal law, and eligible for preemption on that basis.  The Haywood
Court’s analysis rested primarily on the conclusion—that New York’s procedural law
was actually a substantive law to immunize a class of defendants in opposition to the
dictates of federal law.
Although the Court’s conclusion is likely correct, the Court’s analysis leaves
something to be desired from a relational perspective.  The Haywood Court, like the
Brown Court of an earlier era, failed to provide a framework for determining when a
purportedly non-discriminatory procedural rule is so “bound up” with the substantive
federal right that its continued application is the equivalent of an abridgement of the
substantive right.472  The Haywood decision is not clear with respect to what the specific
problem is with the statute.  That is, is the problem with the state’s effort to immunize
state corrections officers?  This would imply that the Court would have invalidated a
state procedural rule solely because it substituted the state for state corrections officers
as defendants in a suit for damages—regardless of where the suit was maintained. 
This substitution would, by itself, have resulted in the effective immunization of a
class of defendants from section 1983 liability.  Or is the problem with the New York
law the fact that it channels a class of section 1983 plaintiffs to a court in which they
receive different (and fewer) protections than other section 1983 claimants?  If this is
the basis of the preemption, then it is less clear that there is a direct conflict between
federal law and state procedure that justifies the Court’s invocation of the Supremacy
Clause, without anything more.473  This failure is all the more important in light of the
advance that seems to have been made in the Court’s analysis in this area over the last
two decades.  These advances mark a turn toward a careful consideration of state and
national interests in the service of the vindication of federal rights.
As stated above, the Court’s decision in Felder is not a model of clarity with re-
spect to the central foundation of its decision to preempt state procedure because the
Court makes reference to both Supremacy Clause justifications for preemption, yet it
conducts an analysis that appears to move beyond the Supremacy Clause to engage the
respective interests represented by the conflict between section 1983 and Wisconsin’s
notice-of-claim rule.474  Here, the Court rests its decision solely on Supremacy with-
out identifying why this is an easy choice.  In the light of the failure to provide a
471 Id. at 2114 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
472 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958).
473 See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988). This is not meant to suggest that the
imposition of such clear procedural burdens as a 90-day notice requirement, or the prohibition
on attorneys’ fees, or punitive damages do not raise a conflict with the congressional scheme
of section 1983 as per Felder; what it means is that the Felder Court thought it helpful to
engage in a much more expansive analysis of the ways in which the exercise of the section
1983 right was unreasonably burdened by the state procedures than occurs in Haywood.
474 See id. at 138–45.
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framework, the Court’s conclusion would have been better served by an analysis
that engaged with the interests of states in enacting particular procedural regimes.475
Unlike Felder, the Court in Haywood deploys the language of enduring connec-
tion between the national and state governments, and consequently their respective
judicial systems.476  However, the rhetorical use of relational discourse does not lead
to an analysis that recognizes a bilateral set of duties and sympathies but simply the
displacement of a state procedural rule without any effort to weigh the state’s com-
peting interest.  Because the state court seemed to be working within an analytical
framework in which non-discrimination norms seem to have been the touchstone, it
would have been helpful for the Court to further instruct all state courts of the appro-
priate analysis within the non-frustration framework.477  Indeed, if my argument is
correct about the analytical role that the concept of an enduring relationship has played
in the doctrinal development of the Court’s “reverse-Erie” case law, it might suggest
that the Court should undertake a narrow reading of the direct conflict between state
procedural rules and federal law to foster the weighing and balancing that seems to
honor the relationship between federal and state judiciaries.478
475 This conclusion is in direct conflict with the solution that Professors Redish and Sklaver
propose—that there ought to be a “strong presumption in favor of the use of federal procedures
when a state court is called upon to adjudicate a federal cause of action.” See Redish & Sklaver,
supra note 15, at 105. Redish and Sklaver’s conclusion is based, as they readily admit, on their
conclusion that the authority to commandeer state courts to entertain federal claims is based
on federal dominance, rather than parity. Id. First, a relational conception of federalism need
not conclude that state courts are equal to federal courts to justify state court duties to federal
claims; it suggests that another basis for the duty exists in the nature of the enduring con-
nection between the courts of the national and state governments. This conclusion makes it
more logically consistent with weighing and balancing, which allows for the inclusion of state
and national interests, in light of the duties that are generated from the relational connection that
seeks to avoid domination. As stated prior, this does not mean that there is not a recognition
of the supremacy of national law and authority and this is not meant to obliterate the obligation
to consider the normative significance of the fact of relationship. The argument, though not
articulated in this way, appears to be assented to by Professor Vicki C. Jackson, who argues
against the sort of bright line rules that Redish and Sklaver advocate. Her argument in favor of
balancing is premised upon her contention that state courts are not “junior varsity versions of
federal courts.” See Jackson, supra note 7, at 127–31.
476 See Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2114–16.
477 In no way do I want to be read as suggesting that the interest-weighing procedure does
not involve significant judicial effort. The Byrd interest-weighing approach has been described
as “analytic labor of the most demanding sort.” GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN,
UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 194 (4th ed. 2009). But this fact, rather than suggesting
a rejection of the approach, suggests that federal courts have an obligation to develop a con-
sistent analytic framework for state courts when addressing the types of issues that arise when
federal claims are litigated in state courts.
478 In some ways this appears to be what takes place in recent Supreme Court Erie analysis,
in which the Court has tried to narrow the displacement of state law. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr.
for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); see also Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S.
2011] FEDERAL LAW IN STATE COURT 589
Finally, what is perhaps most significant in the Haywood decision is the majority’s
silence in the face of the frontal attack by Justice Thomas.  In dissent, Justice Thomas
does not merely reject the Court’s application of the non-frustration principle articu-
lated in Felder, he (joined by Justices Scalia and Alito) took dead aim at the non-
discrimination principle articulated in Testa and other cases.  Thomas asserted that
there was “no textual or historical support for the Court’s incorporation of this anti-
discrimination principle into the Supremacy Clause.”479  For three justices, the Court’s
Supremacy Clause justification of state court obligation to federal law does not bear
the burden demanded of it.  Justice Thomas asserts that neither a textual reading of the
Supremacy Clause nor an understanding of the “historical record” supports the conclu-
sions of the last century of reverse-Erie jurisprudence.  These arguments are not very
different than arguments made by Professor Michael Collins, who has questioned the
basis of the Court’s state obligation jurisprudence in much the same way that Justice
Thomas has outlined.480  The difference at this point is that the issues are not merely
academic, and the Haywood majority offered no rebuttal to this attack.  While it might
strike some as imminently reasonable for the majority to remain silent regarding the
basis of its reliance on the Supremacy Clause, the better to preserve its slim majority.
The Court’s silence might also stem from its failure to account for the role that the
Supremacy Clause plays in its state obligation jurisprudence.  This Article, and the
project of relational federalism, offer the Court an invitation to move beyond its single-
minded commitment to a strict, clause-bound textual support for its state obligation
jurisprudence.  Justice Thomas’s attack on the foundation of modern state obligation
jurisprudence is not an invitation, but a demand that the majority confront the weaken-
ing foundation of its Supremacy Clause justifications of state court obligations to fed-
eral claims.  Silence in the face of a frontal assault is either arrogant or irresponsible.
CONCLUSION
This Article has offered an alternative theoretical landscape for thinking about the
fundamentally important issues of federal and state court interaction.  Though this
Article has focused primarily on the subject of state court obligations when federal
claims are litigated in state tribunals, its relational account of federalism has significant
implications for other federal courts issues.  Most directly, the relational account of
federalism might offer a theoretical frame for understanding the heightened sensitivity
to state interests in the Court’s Erie decisions.481  Perhaps less directly, but no less
740 (1980) (attempting to narrow the range of conflict between the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and state procedural rules to avoid direct supremacy preemption). The Court’s
decision in Gasperini has not been without its detractors. See Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts
on the State of Erie after Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637 (1998).
479 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2123.
480 See Collins, supra note 19.
481 See e.g., Semtek v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); Gasperini v. Ctr. for
the Humanities, 518 U.S. 415 (1996). For a recent case that appears to move away from the
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important, a conception of federalism as enduring relationship, in which rupture is to
be avoided, might be capable of offering a different perspective from which to critique
the Court’s policy of federal court abstention in cases involving domestic relations.482 
To the extent that the domestic relations exception amounts to a wholesale abdication
of federal judicial responsibility over a host of cases that might otherwise be brought
within federal court jurisdiction, it might be read as the Court’s selective tolerance of
“rupture” without any empirical basis that state courts serve as the best forums for the
vindication of significant federal interests.483
Though important to the reconsideration of the interaction of the judicial systems
of the two levels of government, relational conceptions of federalism also contribute
valuably to our understanding of legislative federalism as well.  Given revived debates
about the scope of national authority to enact significant health care reform,484 and the
authority of states to regulate immigration,485 among other areas, it is important that
American constitutional thought remain open to the reconceptualization of areas and
debates with which we have become most familiar.  It is the hope of this project that
we might see the familiar with new eyes.
heightened sensitivity to state interests demonstrated in both Semtek and Gasperini, see Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate Insurance, 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). For academic
criticisms of the Court’s Gasperini case law, see C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment
on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 1997 BYU  L. REV 267; Richard D. Freer, Some
Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV 1637 (1998); Wendy Collins
Purdue, The Sources and Scope of Federal Procedural Common Law: Some Reflections on
Erie and Gasperini, 46 U. KAN. L. REV 751 (1998). For a more sympathetic reading of
Gasperini, see Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad For Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think
the Supreme Court is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 963 (1998).
482 See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
483 The domestic relations exception has been the subject of significant criticism. See, e.g.,
Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073
(1994); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconsidered, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297
(1998); Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction and the Federal
Courts, 66 N.Y.U.  L. REV 1682 (1991).
484 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D.
Va. 2010); see also Renee Landers, “Tomorrow” May Finally Have Arrived—The Patient
Protection Act: A Necessary First Step toward Health Care Equality in the United States,
6 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 65, 75 & nn.41–42 (2010) (noting that the Attorneys General of
thirteen states filed suits alleging the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act violates the
Tenth Amendment and exceeds Congress’s power the day after the President signed the bill
into law, and that the Attorney General of Virginia filed a separate challenge).
485 See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010).
